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THE  FUNDAMENTAL  RIGHT  TO  EDUCATION
Derek W. Black*
New litigation has revived one of the most important questions of constitutional law: Is
education a fundamental right?  The Court’s previous answers have been disappointing.  While
the Court has hinted that it might recognize some minimal right to education, it has thus far
refused to do so.
To recognize a fundamental right to education, the Court would have to overcome two basic
problems.  First, the Court needs an originalist theory for why our Constitution protects educa-
tion, particularly since the word education does not even appear in the Constitution.  Second, the
right to education implicates complex questions regarding its scope.  Those questions would
require the Court to determine the quality of education the Constitution requires.  Neither liti-
gants nor scholars have seriously grappled with these problems, which explains why the Court has
yet to recognize a right to education.  This Article cures both problems.
Not only is this Article the first to offer a compelling originalist argument for a fundamental
right to education, it demonstrates that the right falls squarely within the Court’s existing prece-
dent.  It traces the fundamental importance of education from the nation’s founding principles
through the years immediately following the Fourteenth Amendment.  Most importantly, it details
how, in the years surrounding the final ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
demanded that states guarantee access to public education in their state constitutions and linked
these demands to the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  In fact, after the Fourteenth Amendment, no
state would ever again enter the Union without an education clause in its constitution.  This
history, due to its complexity, has quite simply been overlooked.
This Article is also the first to define the scope of a right to education with historical evi-
dence.  It demonstrates that the original purpose of public education was to prepare citizens to
participate actively in self-government.  In the mid-nineteenth century, this required an educa-
tion that prepared citizens to comprehend, evaluate, and act thoughtfully on the functions and
policies of government.
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INTRODUCTION
On most major measures, educational inequality is holding steady or on
the rise.  Achievement, segregation, and funding data all indicate that poor
and minority students are receiving vastly unequal educational opportuni-
ties.1  For instance, predominantly minority schools receive about $2000 less
per student than predominantly white schools.2  Even putting aside this ine-
1 See G. BOHRNSTEDT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL COMPOSITION AND THE
BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 3 (2015) (finding a persistent and large racial achieve-
ment gap); NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2015:
TOO MANY STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 1
(2015) (finding that nationally, schools with the most low income students receive $1200
less per pupil than schools serving predominantly wealthy students, and schools serving
predominantly minority students receive $2000 less per pupil than schools serving fewer
minority students); Gary Orfield et al., Brown at 62: School Segregation by Race, Poverty
and State 3 (May 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-62-school-segregation-
by-race-poverty-and-state/Brown-at-62-final-corrected-2.pdf (indicating the percentage of
intensely segregated minority schools has tripled since 1988).
2 USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 8.
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quality, overall government commitment to public education is receding.
Since 2008, most states have substantially decreased school funding, some by
more than ten percent.3  The federal government has done little to stem the
decline.  Not since 2002 has the federal government made any substantial
new investment in education.4  Most disturbing, some states are currently tak-
ing steps to amend their state constitutions to weaken support and protection
for public schools.5  Parents increasingly doubt that the public education sys-
tem can weather these challenges and are exiting the system altogether.6  In
short, public education stands in the midst of practical and constitutional
crises.
These crises call for a single solution: a federal fundamental right to
education.  Yet, for the past half century, that right has proven elusive.7  In
1973, the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
explicitly rejected education as a fundamental right and has since refused to
reconsider the issue.8  The Court’s most encouraging language merely hints
3 MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES HAVE
CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1 (2016).
4 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(amended 2015).
5 CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION OF FLORIDA, A PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 1
OF ARTICLE IX OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION (2017), http://flcrc.gov/Proposals/Commis-
sioner/2017/0045/ProposalText/Filed/PDF.pdf (proposing to take local districts’ ability
to block charters away); Tim Carpenter, Kansas GOP Making Moves to Prepare for April Vote on
K-12 Constitutional Amendment, TOPEKA CAP.-J. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.cjonline.com/
state-government/news/education/2017-12-29/kansas-gop-making-moves-prepare-april-
vote-k-12.  Alabama and Mississippi have previously acted on similarly dubious motivations.
See LaJuana Davis, Emerging School Finance Litigation in Mississippi, 36 MISS. C. L. REV. 245,
250 (2018) (discussing an amendment to Mississippi’s education clause in 1960 “to subvert
Brown’s integration directive”); Derek Black, Why Schools Still Can’t Put Segregation Behind
Them, SALON (June 19, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/06/19/why-schools-still-can
not-put-segregation-behind-them/.
6 In the last decade, charter school enrollments have doubled nationally. THOMAS D.
SNYDER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2014, at 204 (50th ed.
2016), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016006.pdf.  In some states, voucher enrollments
have more than quadrupled. See, e.g., IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
ANNUAL REPORT: PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA 6, 22 (2015).  Additionally, compare
FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: JUNE QUARTERLY
REPORT (2009), with FLA. DEP’T OF EDUC., FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM:
JUNE QUARTERLY REPORT (2018).
7 The initial draft of the Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), would have declared education a fundamental right, but the Court dropped the
crucial language to ensure a unanimous opinion.  Hans J. Hacker & William D. Blake, The
Neutrality Principle: The Hidden Yet Powerful Legal Axiom at Work in Brown Versus Board of
Education, 8 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 5, 46–50 (2006).
8 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973); see also Kadrmas
v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (“[Appellants’ position] would require us
to extend the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause beyond the limits recognized in
our cases, a step we decline to take.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) (“The
[Plyler] Court did not, however, measurably change the approach articulated in
Rodriguez.”).
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that it is open to recognizing some narrow interest in a minimally adequate
education.9  Yet after four decades, the Court has failed to recognize any
such interest or right.
Recently, litigants in three different states returned to federal court in
the hope that the Court would finally translate its general commitment to
education into a doctrinal right.10  These lawsuits, however, face the same
unresolved challenge as those that have preceded them: they need a compel-
ling theory for why the Federal Constitution would protect education.  To
begin with, the word “education” does not appear in the Constitution.  More-
over, its importance in modern society is far from enough for the Court to
recognize an implied right.11  Although scholars have written extensively on
the subject, they have done little to close this gap.
Most scholarly theories lack a strong doctrinal argument, operating
instead on the questionable premise that evolving educational norms and
policy-based arguments are enough to prompt the Court to overturn Rodri-
guez.12  The strongest theories suffer from the opposite problem.  They
require the Court to rewrite basic doctrine that would reach well beyond
education.13  And all those that rely on substantive due process shy away
from a strict originalist approach, presumably because conventional wisdom
has suggested that there is no originalist argument to be made for educa-
9 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (suggesting a possible different outcome if an “absolute
denial” of education occurred or a deprivation of “basic minimum skills”).
10 See Class Action Complaint, Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich.
2018) (No. 16-cv-13292); Complaint, Martinez v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-1439, 2018 WL
5993924 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2016); Emma Brown, Black Parents Use Civil War–Era Law to




11 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35 (“[T]he undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State’s social and eco-
nomic legislation.”).
12 See, e.g., Stuart Biegel, Reassessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1100–16 (1989) (focusing on the grievous injuries that
students suffer as a justification for judicial intervention); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the
National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 631–42 (1992) (focusing on the positive
policy effects of the recognition of a right to education); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814–22
(1985); Note, A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due Pro-
cess, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2007).
13 Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 92, 121–48 (2013) (relying heavily on post–Fourteenth Amendment devel-
opments to support a substantive due process claim); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 338–39 (2006) (requiring a reevaluation of privileges
and immunities).
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tion.14  To the extent scholars engage history, they rely primarily on practices
and educational necessities that arose subsequent to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.15  In other words, most commentators have argued that education has
developed into a fundamental right, without addressing whether education
would have been originally considered a fundamental right at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This Article is the first to offer an originalist argument for a fundamental
right to education that falls squarely within the Court’s existing precedent.
The Court need not reverse its privileges and immunities precedent, change
its equal protection scrutiny, develop a theory of the Citizenship Clause, or
develop modern qualitative standards for assessing differences in educational
opportunity.16  Instead, the Court need only apply its well-established stan-
dard for recognizing fundamental rights: the right must be “‘deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.’”17
Although the Court’s fundamental rights analysis remains unchanged,
new historical evidence and insights reveal that, contrary to conventional wis-
dom, education was originally understood as a fundamental right.  Relying
on new evidence and insights, this Article demonstrates that, from the
United States’ founding principles to the final ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself, education has always been understood as a fundamental
right.18  In particular, Congress directly linked the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment to Southern states’ readmission to the Union, as well as
to new commitments in their state constitutions to provide education.  Fur-
thermore, evidence establishes that the Founders held firm beliefs about the
necessity of an educated citizenry in a republican form of government,19
which is also manifest in the distinct educational practices in the United
14 See Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education and the
Tricks of the Trade, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1046–55 (1992) (arguing that claims of a right to
education rely on “tricks of the trade” to obscure the fact that an originalist approach does
not support the right).
15 Friedman & Solow, supra note 13, at 121–48; Liu, supra note 13.
16 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17 (applying the rational basis test to the school financing
system being challenged); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–79 (1873)
(holding that privileges and immunities are not subject to scrutiny in federal court); Liu,
supra note 13, at 335 (explaining the lack of Citizenship Clause precedent); see also City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980) (recognizing over a century of prece-
dent rejecting Guarantee Clause claims).
17 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (internal citations omitted)
(first quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and
then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, (1937)).
18 See infra Part II.
19 See, e.g., President George Washington, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7,
1796); Kara A. Millonzi, Education as a Right of National Citizenship Under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1286, 1286 (2003).
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States as compared with other countries.20  Unsurprisingly, then, when Con-
gress reframed the state-federal relationship through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress acted decisively on those beliefs, demanding education from
every state in the nation.21  In fact, no state would ever again enter the Union
without an education clause in its constitution.
In a prior Article, I detail the three-year period surrounding the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and the procedural implications of those
events.22  Although that three-year period is critically relevant under
Supreme Court precedent, the Court’s historical inquiries would go beyond
that period.  This Article provides answers to those additional inquiries,
examining a broader historical period (from the colonial period through the
end of Reconstruction) and its substantive implications for a fundamental
right to education.
The Court’s recent decisions that recognize a fundament right to bear
arms offer a detailed roadmap for this historical analysis.  In McDonald v. City
of Chicago,23 the Court methodically examined the historical evidence neces-
sary to recognize a new fundamental right under substantive due process.  In
this methodical examination, the Court made five categorical inquiries.  The
five inquiries covered the common-law history of the right well prior to, at
the passage of, and decades following the Fourteenth Amendment.24  Impor-
tantly, the inquiries were not intended to identify specific steps that would
technically incorporate the right within the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Rather, the purpose of the Court’s five inquiries in McDonald was to
determine whether those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would have generally understood the right to be a fundamental one.25
A McDonald-style analysis in the context of education resoundingly indi-
cates education’s similarly fundamental nature.  The first inquiry in McDon-
ald is whether the right has historical roots that stretch back to the founding
of our nation and societies that preceded it.26  While other societies lacked a
commitment to public education,27 the Framers’ view of education was
entirely consistent with its future recognition as a fundamental right in the
20 See, e.g., Sun Go & Peter Lindert, The Uneven Rise of American Public Schools to 1850,
70 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 3 (2010); infra notes 188–89.
21 See, e.g., An Act to Admit the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress of the
United States, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (1870); An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to
Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870); An Act
to Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch.
10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870).
22 Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 735 (2018).
23 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
24 Id. at 767–80.
25 Id. at 768 (looking to the general intent of those who “drafted and ratified” the
Second Amendment).
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Derek Gillard, Chapter 5: 1750–1860: Towards Mass Education, EDUC. IN ENG.:
A HIST. OF OUR SCH. (May 2018), http://www.educationengland.org.uk/history/chapter
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United States.28  At its founding, the United States represented a democratic
experiment distinct from those societies that preceded it.29  Whereas most
other societies would have had little reason to treat education as a right, the
United States was premised on a citizenry that could engage in intelligent
self-rule.30  Consistent with this premise, the Framers aspired to a more edu-
cated and literate citizenry.31
The second inquiry is whether Congress and the states may have taken
practical steps to protect the right following the framing of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.32  Contemporaneous with and immediately following the framing, Con-
gress and the states took several concerted steps to expand access to
education.  Congress devoted land and money toward the expansion of edu-
cation.33  Several states adopted constitutional clauses recognizing the cru-
cial role education plays in a republican form of government.34  Acting on
these commitments, public education rapidly grew.  By the mid-1800s, the
only country in the world with more access to education was Prussia.35
The third inquiry is whether any “threat” to the right existed prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment and whether Congress took any steps to address the
deprivation.36  The historical record on education is particularly persuasive
on this point.  In the pre–Fourteenth Amendment era, Congress came to
view those states with weak education systems as infringing on their citizens’
rights and impeding democracy itself.37  Southern states, in particular, had
made the education of African Americans a crime, and only afforded poor
05.html (indicating the movement toward a system of public education did not begin in
England until the 1800s and there was some hostility toward it).
28 See, e.g., Stephen Earl Bennett et al., Reading’s Impact on Democratic Citizenship in
America, 22 POL. BEHAV. 167, 167 (2000) (“Puritans at Massachusetts Bay colony in the
seventeenth century, visionaries like Thomas Jefferson in the late eighteenth century,
[and] the creators of public schools in the early nineteenth century . . . all believed that
literacy was a sine qua non for effective participation in public affairs.” (internal citations
omitted)).
29 See William Van Til, The American Democratic Experiment, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Oct.
1959, at 6.
30 See id.
31 John Adams wrote:
[A] memorable change must be made in the system of education and knowledge
must become so general as to raise the lower ranks of society nearer to the higher.
The education of a nation instead of being confined to a few schools and universi-
ties for the instruction of the few, must become the national care and expense for
the formation of the many.
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 364 (2001); see also Bennett et al., supra note 28, at 167.
32 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769 (2010).
33 See infra notes 214–16.
34 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (ratified 1780); N.H. CONST. of 1784, reprinted
in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS 2467 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
35 Go & Lindert, supra note 20, at 3.
36 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 770–75.
37 See infra notes 231–37.
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whites limited access to school.38  This led to high illiteracy and low voter
turnout in the South.39  The broader effect was to exclude vast numbers of
citizens from any realistic opportunity to participate in the democratic pro-
cess.  This allowed Southern elites to dominate government and eventually
sparked the Civil War.
Congress responded by passing legislation to address these education
deprivations and move the South toward a working democracy.  Through the
Freedmen’s Bureau,40 Congress directly expanded educational opportunities
throughout the South.41  Congress then used the Reconstruction Act of 1867
to force states to include education clauses in their state constitutions.42
Weeks after passing the Reconstruction Act, Congress would establish a
Department of Education whose practical purpose was to monitor whether
states were carrying out their education obligations.43  The statute indicated
the Department would assess “the condition and progress of education in the
several States” and “aid” in its further expansion “throughout the country.”44
The fourth inquiry is whether the Fourteenth Amendment drafters
would have understood the right to be fundamental.45  Senate debates, as
well as later formal legislation, reveal that Congress believed that a republi-
can form of government must provide education to its citizens.46  Thus Con-
gress would not accept state constitutions that excluded this guarantee.47  As
noted above, Congress had just taken several important steps to ensure that
Southern states provided education.  This alone indicates that Congress saw
education as fundamental.  No right other than voting (which the Court
already recognizes as fundamental) received such favorable treatment by
Congress.48  The clearest evidence of Congress’s intent, however, came
immediately after the Fourteenth Amendment’s final ratification in 1868.
Two years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
was dealing with the readmission of those remaining Confederate states that
were slow to adopt education clauses.  As to these states, Congress applied
38 WILLIAM PRESTON VAUGHN, SCHOOLS FOR ALL: THE BLACKS & PUBLIC EDUCATION IN
THE SOUTH, 1865–1877, at 51–52 (1974) (noting that in 1853, North Carolina enrolled less
than half of eligible children, which did not include African Americans, and by the end of
the war the “rudimentary Southern school systems disintegrated”); Jenny Bourne Wahl,
Legal Constraints on Slave Masters: The Problem of Social Cost, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 17 n.51
(1997).
39 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner)
(recounting calculations based on U.S. Census data); JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL NATION, 1838–1893, at 146 (1991) (noting low voter turnout in the South).
40 See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507.
41 LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783–1876,
at 517–18 (1980).
42 The Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428.
43 An Act to Establish a Department of Education, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 434 (1867).
44 Id.
45 McDonald v. City Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 770–77 (2010).
46 See infra subpart II.C.4.
47 See infra notes 246–52.
48 See Black, supra note 22.
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noticeably harsher standards.  The legislation readmitting those remaining
three states mandated that “the constitution[s] of Virginia[, Mississippi, and
Texas] shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or
class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges
secured by the constitution of said State.”49  In other words, the Fourteenth
Amendment had made all persons born in this country citizens, and states no
longer had the authority to deprive them of their right to education.  In fact,
Congress would never again admit a state to the Union without an education
clause.
The final inquiry is whether those who ratified the Constitution—the
states—also understood the right to be fundamental.50  Here, the constitu-
tional conventions of Southern states are most instructive.  The final five
votes necessary to ratify the Amendment came from Southern states.51  Five
more Southern states ratified the Amendment shortly thereafter.  Prior to
the Civil War, none of these Southern states affirmatively guaranteed educa-
tion.52  By 1868, however, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
nine of ten states seeking readmission had rewritten their constitutions to
guarantee education.53  Delegates to the constitutional conventions offered
the same explanation as Congress for their change—education was necessary
for a republican form of government.54
Education in the states, quite simply, divides clearly into a pre– and
post–Fourteenth Amendment world.  Before the Fourteenth Amendment
was proposed, less than half of the states guaranteed education.55  After the
Fourteenth Amendment, every new and readmitted state would guarantee
education, and others would voluntarily alter their constitutions soon there-
after.56  By 1875, only a single state in the nation would lack an education
49 An Act to Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the
United States, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870).
50 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 777–78.
51 John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
375, 380–409 (2001) (describing the historical events that lead to final ratification).
52 Id.
53 Black, supra note 22, at 788.
54 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAR-
OLINA 486 (Raleigh, Joseph W. Holden 1868) (providing for county governments to carry
out the “Republican principle of local self-government” and serve as “schools” in the les-
sons of “statesmanship” and participatory government, immediately prior to the provision
of education); 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
264 (Charleston, Denny & Perry 1868) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
SOUTH CAROLINA] (detailing a committee report supporting an education article because
education is “the surest guarantee of . . . republican liberty” and thus is the “duty of the
General Assemblies, in all future periods”).
55 See infra notes 251–55.
56 See infra notes 251–55.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-FEB-19 9:04
1068 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
clause, and even that state would have a constitutional provision committed
to helping fund education.57
While the evidence from these five inquiries strongly indicates that edu-
cation is a fundamental right, one equally important question remains: What
is the scope of the fundamental right to education?  Given the wide-ranging
implications, the Supreme Court would expect a clear identification of the
scope of the right before it would recognize any right to education.58
Indeed, a failure to offer an originalist account of the scope of the right
could be enough, alone, for the Court to reject the right.
The Court’s right to bear arms precedent, again, offers a roadmap.  In
District of Columbia v. Heller,59 the Court looked to the original purpose of the
right to help define its scope, along with historical practices and expectations
regarding the right.60  The original purpose and function of the right to edu-
cation is, therefore, critical to understanding its scope.  Those who wrote and
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment made their purpose clear.  They needed
to solve a specific problem and achieve a specific goal.  The specific problem
was the entrenched effects of slavery, illiteracy, and disenfranchisement in
the South.61  The specific goal was to create an education system that would
prepare slaves and illiterate whites for their new roles as citizens in a republi-
can form of government.62  In particular, those who wrote and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment believed that citizens must participate in self-govern-
ment and cast their ballots intelligently.63
The next step is to determine the skills citizens needed to carry out the
citizenship duties that the Framers expected of them.  In the mid-nineteenth
century, voting intelligently required a relatively high level of literacy.  Given
the primitive methods of travel and communication of the time, the written
word was the only way that the vast majority of citizens could access even the
most basic information about their state and federal governments.64  And the
average citizen was keenly interested.  The United States had far more news-
57 Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 458–59 n.132 (explaining that in 1875, New Jersey
adopted its education clause, leaving Connecticut as the only state without one).
58 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) (“‘[T]here will be
more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving [educational problems],’
and . . . ‘the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems’ should be entitled to respect.  On
even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are
divided.” (citation omitted) (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546–47 (1972))).
59 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
60 Id. at 576–600.
61 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
63 See generally Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curricu-
lum, 34 AKRON L. REV. 137, 141 (2000) (“Jefferson thought that citizens must be educated
in order to vote, to protect liberty, and to be vigilant against government corruption.”).
64 Margaret H. DeFleur, James Bryce’s 19th-Century Theory of Public Opinion in the Contem-
porary Age of New Communications Technologies, 1 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 63, 70 (1998).
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papers that were read by a far broader cross section of society than any other
country in the world.65
Through newspapers and other print material, citizens engaged in an
ongoing dialogue about public policy and the constitutions on which they
were routinely called to vote.  Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce—two of
the most noted commentators of our nineteenth-century democracy—would
separately observe that the common man’s avid consumption of these papers
and engagement in public dialogue was both a manifestation of our form of
government itself and the tool through which he held government accounta-
ble.66  This dialogue was premised on a high level of literacy and a working
understanding of government functions and individual rights.67
Drawing on the original purpose of public education and the practical
demands of citizenship, this Article demonstrates that an originalist account
of the fundamental right to education entails a set of skills and competencies
largely grounded in literacy and critical thinking.68  More specifically, the
right to education requires that students have access to learning opportuni-
ties that prepare them to comprehend, evaluate, and act thoughtfully on the
functions and policies of government.  Modern perspectives on education
might urge a broader education right that also includes math and other
skills,69 but those skills relate more toward the modern workplace and higher
education than the demands of democracy.
It is worth noting, however, that the critical literacy and civics-based edu-
cation that the nineteenth century demanded also remain crucially relevant
today.  Commentators increasingly warn that far too many students today
lack the skills they need to navigate the information age and our fracturing
political landscape.70  They do not possess basic civics knowledge, much less
the ability to evaluate public debate and cast their vote intelligently.71  Only
half recognize that the press should be free from government control.72
Upon graduation, most still cannot name the three branches of government
or the purpose of the Declaration of Independence.73  These educational
65 Richard Carwardine, Abraham Lincoln and the Fourth Estate: The White House and the
Press During the American Civil War, 7 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY HIST. 1, 3 (2006).
66 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 929–30 (Liberty Fund 1995) (1888);
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55, 186 (J.P. Mayer, ed., George Law-
rence trans., Harper & Row, 1966) (1835).
67 See, e.g., Leon Botstein, Damaged Literacy: Illiteracies and American Democracy, 119
DAEDALUS 55, 60–61 (1990).
68 See infra notes 363–81.
69 See, e.g., 91 HIDEYUKI KANEMATSU & DANA M. BARRY, STEM AND ICT EDUCATION IN
INTELLIGENT ENVIRONMENTS 25–29 (2016).
70 MICHAEL A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY: SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC PARTICIPA-
TION 7–19 (2018).
71 Id.
72 MATTHEW DUBIN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CITIZEN AND THE CONSTITUTION, SURVEY
RESULTS: 2009 NATIONAL FINALISTS’ KNOWLEDGE AND SUPPORT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 13 (2009).
73 REBELL, supra note 70, at 18.
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shortcomings then seriously impact their ability to self-govern as adults.  Over
the last few election cycles, so many adults have incorrectly read ballots and
proposed laws that they shifted the actual outcome of elections and refer-
enda.74  The cure to these modern ills is the same educational opportunities
that the Framers and Ratifiers sought to enshrine a century and a half ago.
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I examines the various consti-
tutional clauses through which the Court could recognize a right to educa-
tion, reasoning that the Citizenship Clause and Guarantee Clause, as a matter
of original history, are the most natural fits.  But as with equal protection and
privileges and immunities, the Court has developed general doctrines over
the years that these “natural fits” are unlikely candidates for recognizing a
right to education.  Part II explains how the Court has used substantive due
process as an escape doctrine, recognizing rights through due process so as
to not upset its general doctrines elsewhere.  Part II then applies the Court’s
substantive due process test and its historical inquiries to education, demon-
strating that an extremely compelling historical record exists to recognize
education as a fundamental right.  Part III develops the scope of that right,
identifying the original purpose to prepare individuals for self-government
and then drawing on prevailing practices to determine what skills those indi-
viduals would have needed.
I. THE BARRIERS TO A RIGHT TO EDUCATION
The conventional wisdom has long been that our constitutional Framers
did not intend to provide any particular protection for education.75  Most
litigation and scholarship has been premised on theories that (a) education,
as a practical matter, has become so important to individuals’ life chances
that the Constitution must protect it,76 or (b) state and federal laws have
evolved so much over the last several decades that they finally justify height-
ened scrutiny for inequalities and deprivations.77  In other words, modern
education justifies new judicial interpretations.
In the last decade, however, three other authors have made historical
arguments in support of a constitutional right to education.  Barry Friedman
74 LAWRENCE NORDEN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BETTER BALLOTS 9 (2008);
Amy N. Farley et al., Democracy Under Fire: Voter Confusion and Influences in Colorado’s Anti-
Affirmative Action Initiative, 83 HARV. EDUC. REV. 432 (2013).
75 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitu-
tion.  Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
76 Biegel, supra note 12, at 1100–16 (focusing on the grievous injuries that students
suffer as a justification for judicial intervention); Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education Rights
and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 468 (2014).
77 Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First
Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1393–95
(2010); Martha I. Morgan, Fundamental State Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in Federal
Equal Protection Review, 17 GA. L. REV. 77, 101 (1982).
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and Sara Solow offer the simplest theory.78  They argue that the national
commitment to education dates from the Fourteenth Amendment to today,
growing stronger with each generation.79  A simple application of the
Supreme Court’s fundamental rights test to this history can render only one
conclusion—our Constitution should protect, at the very least, a minimally
adequate education.80  They do little, however, to identify the substance of
that right.
Goodwin Liu offers a more technical argument.81  He also traces a
national commitment to education from the Civil War era to today, but Liu
focuses on Congress’s support for education immediately following the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.82  He argues that this congres-
sional support, coupled with Fourteenth Amendment debates, establish that
education is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship.83
While these scholars make important contributions to the historical
debate, they overlook an even more specific historical record that reveals
Congress and the states did not just favor education.  As further detailed
below in Part II, Congress and the states mandated the provision of public
education in conjunction with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself.  Without the votes of Southern states, the Fourteenth Amendment
would not have become part of the U.S. Constitution in 1868.  And without
their affirmative votes, Congress would not readmit those states to the
Union.84  Not only did Congress condition Southern states’ readmission on
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress also required Southern
states to adopt new state constitutions that conformed to a “republican” form
of government,85 which included the provision of education.  The result was
a complete transformation of the rights of citizenship.  By 1868, nine of the
ten Southern states seeking readmission had ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and mandated the provision of education in their state constitutions.86
As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment became an actual amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and those Southern states reentered the Union.87  The
most historically honest interpretation of this history is that education was a
78 Friedman & Solow, supra note 13, at 92.
79 Id. at 121–48.
80 Id. at 96.
81 Liu, supra note 13.
82 Id. at 368–96.
83 Id. at 335–36.
84 The Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
85 Id.
86 See ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of
1868, art. VIII, §§ 1–2; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art.
CXXXV; MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2; S.C. CONST.
of 1868, art. X, § 3; TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 1.
87 Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat. 708 (1868) (Secretary of State William Seward) (rec-
ognizing ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment based on states’ action and the joint
resolutions of the U.S. House and Senate).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 14 12-FEB-19 9:04
1072 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
right secured by the Guarantee Clause, which requires a republican form of
government, or the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.88
Current constitutional doctrine, however, presents serious problems for
recognizing the right to education on these bases.  The history, while fixed,
must filter through Supreme Court precedent that has, at times, been con-
trary to history.  After the Civil War, Supreme Court precedent was more
intent on undoing the Fourteenth Amendment than enforcing it.89  The
Court has since corrected some of its mistakes,90 but others remain part of a
much larger set of general doctrinal principles that are hard to unravel
now.91  Thus, even if the history supporting a right to education is as plain as
day, fitting the right into the Court’s existing jurisprudence is not.
For purposes of the right to education, the most relevant doctrines per-
tain to the Guarantee, Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Due
Process Clauses.  All of these constitutional clauses include principles that
could plausibly translate the history of education in the United States into a
tangible constitutional right.  Yet, each of these constitutional provisions
entails substantial doctrinal hurdles.  For the most part, these doctrinal hur-
dles have little if anything to do with education and more to do with histori-
cal anomalies, federalism concerns, and judicial philosophy regarding the
interpretation of the Constitution.  Regardless, the barriers remain
formidable.
The most obvious constitutional provision to anchor a constitutional
right to education is arguably the Guarantee Clause.  The Guarantee Clause
provided the specific authority for Congress to demand public education sys-
tems from states following the Civil War.92  Congress made the demand not
just as a base exercise of power, but on the well-founded belief that education
was a necessary component of a republican form of government.93  Yet, as
neatly as an education right might fit within the Guarantee Clause, the pros-
pects of judicially enforcing a right to education through the Guarantee
Clause are relatively bleak given the Court’s general precedent in the area.
Prior to the Civil War, the Court in Luther v. Borden reasoned republican
form of government claims raise political questions that are reserved to Con-
gress and are nonjusticiable.94  The Court has since reaffirmed this general
88 Black, supra note 22.
89 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
90 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506–08 (4th ed. 2011).
91 See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (discussing the Court’s privileges and
immunities precedent).
92 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”).
93 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168–69 (1867) (indicating that Con-
gress retained the right to withhold admission to states whose constitutions lacked an edu-
cation clause); id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Sumner) (arguing that senators were “entitled”
to “refuse to vote for” a constitution that did not provide for education).
94 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42, 46–47 (1849) (writing as to the “guaran-
tee to each State a republican government [that] Congress must necessarily decide what
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principle several times.95  In the 1960s, the Court hinted at an exception to
this general rule,96 but has never explicitly recognized an exception.  Thus,
as compelling as the recognition of certain education rights through the
Guarantee Clause might be, the odds of the Court doing so are low.  The
Court would need to revisit a long line of cases just to recognize a new excep-
tion for education.97  The Court’s dominant approach over the past century
has been to work new rights into existing precedent rather rewrite broad
swaths of old precedent.98
The Privileges and Immunities Clause offers another theoretically com-
pelling doctrinal filter for education.  The Constitution explicitly prohibit
states from “abridg[ing] the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.”99  Whether understood as a necessary component of a repub-
lican form of government or simply something that Congress demanded of
all states following the Civil War, education became, alongside voting, a core
right and privilege of citizenship.100  “Privileges or immunities” is an inher-
ently open-ended category that education easily falls within.101  Yet again, the
Court’s precedent is highly problematic.
Less than a decade after the Civil War, the Court’s holding in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases102 rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause all but void.
The Court wrote that “privileges and immunities . . . are left to the State
governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under
the special care of the Federal government.”103  Thus, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause does not give rise to federal claims.  The Court reached a
government is established in the State . . . [and] whether it is republican or not. . . .  And
its decision is binding on every other department of the government, and could not be
questioned in a judicial tribunal.”).
95 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 & n.17 (1980) (challenge
to the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
218–29 (1962) (challenge to apportionment of state legislative districts); Pac. States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140–51 (1912) (challenge to initiative and referendum
provisions of state constitution).
96 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (“[S]ome questions raised under the
Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184
(1992) (citing cases pre-Luther).
97 Jack Balkin, however, argues that Luther v. Borden does not stand for an absolute and
broad prohibition of guarantee clause claims. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 241
(2011).
98 Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court
and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J.
1051 (2000) (providing an overview of the Court’s incorporation of individual rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
100 See Black, supra note 22.
101 John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1391–97 (1992) (describing privileges or immunities as a mystery, exploring the riddle,
and concluding it included the everyday rights of state citizenship).
102 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
103 Id. at 78.
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similarly problematic conclusion in regard to due process and equal protec-
tion, only to reverse its position in later cases,104 but its privileges or immuni-
ties holding remains good law.105
In only one instance in history has the Court ever used the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to invalidate a state law.106  The issue in the case was par-
ticularly unique—involving the right of interstate travel—and not susceptible
to extrapolation to education.107  Unless the Court intends to correct its
overall Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities precedent, the
clause is an unlikely vehicle for the right to education.  Only one Justice has
shown any serious interest in this larger project.108
The remaining mechanisms for protecting the right to education—
equal protection and due process—are less obvious, at least as a matter of
history.  The notion that the Framers did not intend education to be a right
of citizenship or a foundation for a republican form of government but
would have expected educational deprivations to be subject to rigorous equal
protection or due process analysis is hard to justify.  Nonetheless, equal pro-
tection is the sole mechanism through which the Court has considered a
fundamental right to education.109  In San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, the Court rejected education as a fundamental right under equal
protection.110  The Court reasoned that education is not explicitly men-
tioned in the Constitution and the importance of education is an insufficient
basis to afford it heightened scrutiny.111
Scholars have since offered strong arguments for why the underlying
facts regarding education have changed enough to warrant a different out-
come.  For instance, the fact that several state courts have since declared edu-
cation a fundamental right under state law suggests that Rodriguez’s logic is
no longer sound.112  No clear rationale explains why federal law would
excuse differential access to education when the state itself has already
104 Compare id. at 80–81 (rejecting due process and equal protection claims regarding
right to practice a profession), with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (recognizing
a due process right of economic liberty).
105 See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 503–04 (reasoning that interstate travel is a unique right over which there has
been no disagreement).
108 Id. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109 The Court has applied procedural due process, but that is to protect student’s statu-
tory property right in the context of school suspensions.  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
110 San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (“We have carefully
considered each of the arguments supportive of the District Court’s finding that education
is a fundamental right or liberty and have found those arguments unpersuasive.”).
111 Id. at 32, 35.
112 See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249,
255–56 (N.C. 1997); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie Cty. Sch.
Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
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declared education a fundamental or constitutional right.113  Logic aside,
however, the holding in Rodriguez remains firmly in place, and the Court has
passed on other opportunities to narrow or revisit Rodriguez.114
The final filter for the right to education—due process—may be the
least obvious from a historical standpoint.  By its explicit terms, the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires states to afford individuals fair procedures prior to
depriving them of life, liberty, or property.115  While procedural protections
may be helpful in the context of preventing erroneous suspensions from
school, procedural protections do not require that states provide education
in the first instance or that the education they provide be of some quality.116
Claims as to these affirmative obligations rest on what the Court calls substan-
tive due process.
Substantive due process evolved from the notion that some individual
rights are so important that the state is not free to infringe them, regardless
of the advance warning or process a state provides.117  The key question is
whether the state has a good enough reason to infringe on a person’s
rights.118  Only those rights that the Court deems fundamental under sub-
stantive due process receive heightened scrutiny.119  To determine whether a
right is fundamental, the Court asks whether the right is “ ‘deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.’”120
Several scholars have concluded that education meets this test.121  They
point to the general traditions surrounding education, compulsory attend-
ance laws, state governments’ provision of education since the nineteenth
century, the federal government’s financial support for those efforts, and the
federal government’s more recent efforts to regulate certain state educa-
tional activities.122  They also emphasize that the Supreme Court has long
“extolled the virtues of public education, recognizing ‘the public schools as a
most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of gov-
113 See Black, supra note 77, at 1343; Morgan, supra note 77, at 101.
114 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
115 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
116 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
117 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 90, at 558–61.
118 Id.
119 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997).
120 Id. at 720–21 (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325, 326, (1937)).
121 See, e.g., Imoukhuede, supra note 76, at 468; Note, supra note 12, at 1327; Michael
Salerno, Note, Reading Is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind Act Necessitates Recognition
of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 509, 510 (2007).
122 See Bitensky, supra note 12, at 586–90, 596; Friedman & Solow, supra note 13, at 96,
112–17, 121–45, 155.
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ernment’ that is intrinsic to American national identity and culture.”123  This
history, they reason, suffices to establish education as a right deeply rooted in
this nation’s history and tradition, as required by the Court.124
This historical treatment, however, remains relatively general and amor-
phous as compared to the evidence the Court has required in recent
cases.125  Over the last three to four decades, the Court has grown increas-
ingly restrictive in its recognition of new fundamental rights.126  For instance,
in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court expressed the sentiment that it needed
“to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due-process
judicial review.”127  The only exception to this trend has been in regard to
the rights of same-sex couples,128 but even here, the extent to which the
Court made an exception is unclear.129  The Court grounded these cases in
equal protection, as well as substantive due process,130 presumably in an
attempt to shield itself from the critiques that have plagued substantive due
process.131  This general reluctance in substantive due process cases repre-
sents a significant, although not explicit, barrier that the right to education
would have to overcome, notwithstanding its general merits.
II. EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The modern expansion of substantive due process is, at least partly, a
byproduct of the Court’s historically restrictive privileges or immunities pre-
cedent.  Substantive due process operates as an escape clause of sorts.132
123 Bitensky, supra note 12, 588–89 (footnote omitted) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see also Friedman &
Solow, supra note 13, at 119–20.
124 Bitensky, supra note 12, at 596; Friedman & Solow, supra note 13, at 96.
125 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
126 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (fundamental liberty interests must be
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987))); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (“[W]e have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as a
‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ . . . but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our
society.”).
127 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
128 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
129 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] discus-
sion is, quite frankly, difficult to follow.  The central point seems to be that there is a
‘synergy between’ the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, and that some
precedents relying on one Clause have also relied on the other.”).
130 See, e.g., id. at 2590; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
131 See, e.g., John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L.
REV. 493, 496 (1997) (arguing that “the precedential authority of substantive due process is
less than it might seem”).
132 See Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The Arbitrary Path of Due Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197,
211–13 (2000).  Equal protection, likewise, may have provided an escape clause for voting
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Most Framers would have likely been shocked by the notion that after passing
the Fourteenth Amendment, states would have retained the power to sup-
press free speech, strip individuals of property without just compensation,
search homes without warrants, or imprison people without full and fair judi-
cial hearings.  Yet this is exactly what the Slaughter-House Cases allowed.
The modern Court avoids ahistorical results of this sort through an ad
hoc substantive due process analysis.  Rather than apply the Bill of Rights
wholesale against the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
Court has assessed each protection in the Bill of Rights on its own.133  As to
each, the Court asks whether the right in question is “ ‘deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacri-
ficed.’”134  The Court has further described this inquiry as an assessment of
“immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free govern-
ment”135 and “a fair and enlightened system of justice.”136
These questions are by their nature philosophical, but the Court’s analy-
sis is largely driven by the historical practices during the relevant periods of
our constitutional framing, as well as practices in other ordered societies
prior to the United States.  These inquiries can be as general or specific as
the Court wants.  This allows the Court to avoid constitutional technicalities
while still adhering to history, tradition, and most of the protections con-
tained in the Bill of Rights.
The Court’s right to bear arms jurisprudence offers a clear example of
substantive due process as a bypass.  In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court
held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not incorporate the right to bear arms, and so it remained for well over a
century.137  Finally, in 2010 in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court recog-
nized a fundamental right to bear arms, but still refused to disturb its privi-
leges and immunities precedent.138  It did not contest the “overwhelming”
gerrymandering challenges.  In Baker v. Carr, the Court devoted extensive attention to the
possibility that gerrymandering claims implicate the Guarantee Clause, under which they
would be nonjusticiable, before holding that the claims could be decided under equal
protection regardless.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217–29 (1962).
133 See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982).
134 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (internal citations omitted)
(first quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and
then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, (1937)).
135 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 102 (1908) (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 389 (1898)).
136 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)
(asking whether “a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular
protection”); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (rights that are “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”).
137 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (discussing petitioners’
request that the Court overrule United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)).
138 Id. at 756–58.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 20 12-FEB-19 9:04
1078 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
scholarly consensus that Slaughter-House Cases are “egregiously wrong.”139
But rather than “disturb the Slaughter-House holding,” the Court simply
resorted to substantive due process as an alternative.140  The Court
attempted to explain how the privileges or immunities inquiry is distinct
from substantive due process and thus, conflicting outcomes under the two
doctrines can coexist.141  They can coexist because, unlike the Court’s other
doctrines, substantive due process eschews all technicalities.  Whatever may
have been the Framers’ intent regarding the Bill of Rights, privileges or
immunities, or citizenship in a republican form of government, the Court’s
substantive due process precedent asks a simpler, albeit historically demand-
ing, question.142
The simpler substantive due process inquiry has enormous practical
advantages for the recognition of a right to education.  First, substantive due
process does not rest on narrow questions that the Framers and Ratifiers
never considered.143  Thus, it can moot the technical questions regarding
how education fits within the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ intentions regarding
citizenship, privileges or immunity, congressional power, and a republican
form of government.144  Second, in place of technical questions, substantive
due process asks a set of malleable historical questions, the answers to which
all emphatically point toward recognizing education as a fundamental
right.145
As the following Sections detail, the history supporting education as a
fundamental right starts with the founding ideas of our nation and continues
through the modern day.  The gravity of the right increases at important
historical markers.  Well before the Fourteenth Amendment, education was
embedded in the very concept of democratic government that the nation’s
Founders sought to enshrine.146  Widespread access to education, however,
did not exist in many states and locations for the first century of the
139 Id.
140 Id. at 758.
141 Id. at 758–66.
142 Id. at 767.
143 See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 866 (1986) (modern legal analysis asks ques-
tions distinct from those that the Framers considered).
144 See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish for: Why McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago’s Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing for Rights,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 561, 562–64 (2011) (warning that a resurrection of privileges and
immunities might be a bad thing).
145 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the start-
ing point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring))); see also Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of
History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 677 (2013) (“Arguments that appeal to the Founders or
the Framers as an undifferentiated whole, or that conflate different generations (revolut-
ionaries, Framers, politicians of the early federal period) are likely to be arguments from
tradition or ethos.”).
146 See infra notes 195–217.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 21 12-FEB-19 9:04
2019] the  fundamental  right  to  education 1079
nation.147  In those locations, education remained an idealistic aspiration
that the governmental system failed to fully deliver.  Several in Congress
regarded this failure as playing no small part in the Civil War itself.148
Congress acted to correct these education failures after the War.
Through the Freedmen’s Bureau, the Fourteenth Amendment, and South-
ern readmission, Congress established and demanded public education.149
Southern states responded positively and were followed by other states later.
Before the end of the nineteenth century, all but one state guaranteed edu-
cation in its constitution, and even the single outlier included a constitu-
tional provision that set aside funds for education.150  This history reveals
that the right to education is not one that simply evolved due to modern
necessities or an expanded federal footprint.  Rather, a commitment to edu-
cation as a fundamental necessity of citizenship was with the nation from the
beginning.  It was only the practical implementation of this necessity that
took time to achieve.
A. The Court’s Historical Roadmap for Fundamental Rights
The Court’s opinion in McDonald provides a straightforward roadmap
for identifying the precise historical facts necessary to establish a right as fun-
damental.  The Court’s historical analysis in McDonald involves several dis-
tinct inquiries.  First, as to pre–Fourteenth Amendment history, the Court
looked for analogs to and recognition of the right in ancient times, England,
and the colonies.151  Here, the source of the right to bear arms was the more
general right of self-defense.152  Second, the Court looked to ratification
debates from the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights that followed.153
Here, the Court emphasized the evils the Founders sought to ward off and
their sense that the right to bear arms was a necessity.154  The Court also
examined the states’ and legal commentators’ treatment of the right follow-
ing the ratification of the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights, point-
ing out that new state constitutions provided for the right to bear arms and
147 See, e.g., DOROTHY ORR, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN GEORGIA 175 (1950) (noting
that “there were marked differences among the counties in the management of school
affairs” in Georgia); VAUGHN, supra note 38, at 51–52 (noting that in 1853, North Carolina
enrolled less than half of eligible white children and, by the end of the war, the “rudimen-
tary Southern school systems disintegrated”).
148 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1870) (statement of Sen.
Edmunds) (stating the aristocratic tendencies of the South and lack of general education
led to the Civil War); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1867) (statement of Sen.
Sumner) (assigning blame for the War on the lack of education).
149 See infra notes 201–30.
150 See infra notes 251–55.
151 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010).
152 Id.
153 See id. at 768–69.
154 See id.
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legal commentators described the right as an essential “libert[y] of a
republic.”155
The Court then turned to the historical events surrounding the Four-
teenth Amendment itself.  The Court’s third inquiry was of infringements of
the right to bear arms, and congressional responses to it before and after the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.156  The Court found evidence of
those infringements, for instance, in the fact that the Thirty-Ninth and Forti-
eth Congresses found it necessary to take steps to prevent the disarmament
of former soldiers and citizens at the close of the Civil War.157  The Court
then offered detailed analysis of the legislation most closely connected to and
giving rise to the Fourteenth Amendment—Freedmen’s Bureau legislation
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  The Court pointed out that the Freedmen’s
Bureau Act explicitly protected the right to bear arms, and reasoned that
Congress implicitly incorporated that right in the Civil Rights Act’s broad
language protecting “the security of person and property.”158
Fourth, the Court examined the Fourteenth Amendment debates.
Here, the details may be the sparsest.  The Court only offered a quote from a
single senator, who argued that the right to bear arms was essential to lib-
erty.159  The Court then added that even those who opposed the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that blacks had a right to bear arms.160  The Court’s
final inquiry was of state practices immediately following ratification, particu-
larly in state constitutions.  The Court found that “22 of 37 States . . . had
state constitutional provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear
arms.”161
These final two inquiries reveal two important points.  First, a precise
intent to incorporate the right to bear arms in the Fourteenth Amendment is
unnecessary.  The Court’s focus is on whether the Framers and Ratifiers
understood the right to be fundamental, not whether they technically took
action to create a federal right.  The second point is that Congress’s and the
states’ understandings are of equal importance.  Speaking of them as two
parts of a single inquiry into original intent, the Court wrote, “the Framers
and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to keep and
bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty.”162
155 Id. at 769–70 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1890, at 746 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833)).
156 Id. at 770–72.
157 Id. at 772–75.
158 Id. at 774 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27); id. at 774–75
(concluding that although the Civil Rights Act did not explicitly protect the right to bear
arms, the available debates and circumstantial evidence point to an intent to “protect ‘the
constitutional right to bear arms’ and not simply to prohibit discrimination.” (quoting
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176)).
159 Id. at 775–76.
160 Id. at 776.
161 Id. at 777.
162 Id. at 778.
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As with the right to bear arms, the Court does not need to reexamine its
privileges or immunities precedent to recognize a right to education.  It need
only follow a compelling historical record demonstrating a pervasive belief
among the Framers and Ratifiers that education is a fundamental right in our
constitutional democracy.  Violations of this right led Congress and the states
to take very aggressive steps to ensure it following the Civil War.  Not only
does the history reveal a right deeply rooted in history as fundamental to the
individual, but in the absence of education, the Founders feared our system
of democracy and the liberty it protects would crumble.
B. Pre–Fourteenth Amendment History: Founders, Education,
and the Demands of Self-Rule
A general right to public education does not have its roots in ancient
times or England, but its absence makes perfect sense.  Education in ancient
times was not ideologically or practically connected to ancient or common-
law forms of government.163  In monarchies, the common man had little to
no ability to engage in self-rule.164  Moreover, in ancient and common-law
societies, a large portion of society fell below the status of America’s common
man.165  The vast lower classes were comprised of serfs, slaves, and individu-
als who were dependent on third parties.166  The United States was a new
experiment in a republican form of government that, at least in theory,
required a reversal of these ancient norms.167
The original Constitution’s Framers and state governments both under-
stood education as important to the nation’s values and breaking from prior
norms.168  In his 1796 Annual Message to Congress, President George Wash-
ington wrote:
163 While Greece claimed to be democratic, it had slaves, as did Rome. See WILLIAM L.
WESTERMANN, THE SLAVE SYSTEMS OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITY 12, 63(1955).
164 This problem is a principal premise in Thomas Paine’s Common Sense.  See THOMAS
PAINE, COMMON SENSE (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1997) (1776).
165 See, e.g., Walter Scheidel, Human Mobility in Roman Italy, II: The Slave Population, 95 J.
ROMAN STUD. 64, 64–65 (2005) (discussing varying estimates of Rome’s slave population,
many of which believed the slave population as roughly the same size or larger than free
society).
166 See, e.g., id.
167 The United States, of course, retained the contradiction of slavery at its founding.
Congress, through the Reconstruction Act of 1867, would correct this contradiction,
demand public education, and ensure the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
infra subsection II.C.4.
168 See generally CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC, COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 5–6 (Eric Foner ed., 1983) (describing Founders’ views
that public education would promote national identity and social order); MCCULLOUGH,
supra note 31, at 364 (quoting John Adams, who wrote, “[A] memorable change must be
made in the system of education and knowledge must become so general as to raise the
lower ranks of society nearer to the higher.  The education of a nation instead of being
confined to a few schools and universities for the instruction of the few, must become the
national care and expense for the formation of the many.”); Steven Forde, Benjamin Frank-
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[T]he assimilation of the principles, opinions, and manners of our country-
men by the common education of a portion of our youth from every quarter
well deserves attention.  The more homogenous our citizens can be made in
these particulars the greater will be our prospect of permanent union; and a
primary object of . . . a national institution should be the education of our
youth in the science of government.  In a republic what species of knowl-
edge can be equally important and what duty more pressing on its legisla-
ture than to patronize a plan for communicating it to those who are to be
the future guardians of the liberties of the country?169
In his 1806 address to Congress, President Thomas Jefferson made even
bolder claims and requests.  He proposed that future taxes and excess trust
funds be spent on education and explained precisely why:
Education is here placed among the articles of public care [because] . . . a
public institution can alone supply those sciences which, though rarely
called for, are yet necessary to complete the circle, all the parts of which
contribute to the improvement of the country, and some of them to its
preservation.170
President Jefferson argued that education was so important to the nation that
Congress should, if necessary, amend the Constitution to allow for educa-
tion’s support.171
The necessity of education to the United States’ republican form of gov-
ernment rested on a few basic premises.172  The first premise was that the
people would engage in self-rule, which meant that all (white men) would
vote.173  The second premise was that citizens had a duty to vote.174  Those
eligible to vote took this duty very seriously in the early 1800s, voting at
extremely high rates—often hovering around eighty percent and sometimes
rising above ninety percent.175  As these numbers confirm, “[r]ich and poor,
lin, in THE FOUNDERS’ ALMANAC 45, 55–56 (Matthew Spalding ed., 2002) (discussing Frank-
lin’s rejection of the European model of education that catered to privilege).
169 Washington, supra note 19.
170 President Thomas Jefferson, Sixth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1806).
171 See id.
172 See, e.g., Ross J. Pudaloff, Education and the Constitution: Instituting American Culture,
in LAWS OF OUR FATHERS: POPULAR CULTURE AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 23, 26–27 (Ray B.
Browne & Glenn J. Browne eds., 1986) (“By a necessary definition, a republican education
was a mass education . . . .”).
173 See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 864 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing our Constitution’s “promise” of “self-rule”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
52, at 323 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The
definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republi-
can government.”).
174 DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION
334–35 (1996) (discussing Adams, etc.); SILBEY, supra note 39, at 141 (recounting the view
that it was the “noblest political duty” to vote and it could not be withheld).
175 SILBEY, supra note 39, at 144–46; National General Election VEP Turnout Rates,
1789–Present, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present
(last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
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learned and uneducated participated at reasonably similar levels to produce
an almost fully mobilized electorate.”176
The third premise was that citizens would vote intelligently.177  The
Framers expected that “individual citizens examined the candidates and
issues both thoroughly and objectively.  They then reached their voting deci-
sion by the exercise of reason and made their choice on the basis of enlight-
ened self-interest, but in such a way that the common good was served.”178
This exercise of reason required education.  “Puritans at Massachusetts Bay
colony in the seventeenth century, visionaries like Thomas Jefferson in the
late eighteenth century, [and] the creators of public schools in the early
nineteenth century . . . all believed that literacy was a sine qua non for effec-
tive participation in public affairs.”179
These education expectations were also reflected in the official acts of
both Congress and the states.180  Congress transferred extensive federal land
to states and territories, requiring that they use the land and proceeds from it
to establish and provide for schools.181  The Northwest Ordinance of 1785
required that each new town set aside “the lot No. 16 . . . for the maintenance
of public schools within the said township.”182  Some states acted through
their constitutions.  Among the original thirteen states, five adopted constitu-
tions between 1776 and 1787 that referenced support for or commitment to
education.183  The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for instance, empha-
sized the importance of education, stating that the state should “cherish” and
“encourage” education.184  Its rationale was plain: the “diffus[ion of educa-
176 PAUL KLEPPNER, WHO VOTED? THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT, 1870–1980, at
143 (Gerald M. Pomper ed., 1982).
177 HORACE MANN, LECTURES ON EDUCATION 55–56 (Boston, Ide & Dutton 1855) (1840)
(“The theory of our government is,—not that all men, however unfit, shall be voters,—but
that every man, by the power of reason and the sense of duty, shall become fit to be a voter.
Education must bring the practice as nearly as possible to the theory.”); O’Brien, supra
note 63, at 141 (“Jefferson thought that citizens must be educated in order to vote . . . .”);
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“Thomas Jefferson pointed out . . .
that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence.”).
178 DeFleur, supra note 64, at 74.
179 Bennett et al., supra note 28, at 167 (citations omitted).
180 The Constitution itself also included indirect support for education.  Although
often overlooked, the Copyright Clause was connected to the furtherance of education.
Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259, 287–88
(explaining that the meaning of “science” comes from Charles Pinckney, who intended an
“educational or scholastic denotation”).
181 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (1986) (discussing Congress’s policy of
reserving land in every township for public schools).
182 Id. (quoting 1 LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 565 (Philadelphia, John
Bioren, & W. John Duane 1815)).
183 John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State Con-
stitutional Provisions for Education: 1776–1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 3 (1998).
184 MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (ratified 1780).
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tion] generally among the body of the people . . . [is] necessary for the pres-
ervation of their rights and liberties.”185  Four years later, New Hampshire
concurred in this same general maxim in its constitution,186 with a number
of other state constitutions doing the same in the early 1800s.187
The net result of these efforts was the rapid expansion of education.
While public education remained rudimentary in many locations during the
pre–Civil War era, the United States’ progress stood out in the world.  By the
mid-1800s, the only country with a higher primary school enrollment than
the United States was Prussia.188  Outside observers saw the nation’s
expanding literacy and education as a testament to America’s unique com-
mitment to self-government.  Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: “I think there is no
other county in the world where, proportionately to the population, there
are so few ignorant and so few learned individuals . . . .”189
A modern study of the late 1700s to 1850 goes even further to confirm
an empirical link between our form of government, voting, and access to
education.  It found that the expansion of education (and lack thereof) in
particular geographic locations in the United States correlated with the
expansion of democratic participation (and lack thereof) in the United
States.190  “[O]rdinary white Americans had an advantage over common men
in their European countries of origin: They had more political voice relative
to local elites, and increasingly so over the first half-century of indepen-
dence.”191  They leveraged that voice to enact policies to expand education.
“The earlier suffrage of middling American white citizens seems to have
accelerated the rise of public primary schooling . . . .”192  The study found
the same phenomena occurring within the United States: those areas afford-
ing the common man the most participation in government then devoted
the most resources to education.193
In sum, pre–Fourteenth Amendment history reveals a strong ideological
foundation and rationale for education as a fundamental right.  Public edu-
cation began as a nascent idea closely tied to the nation’s form of govern-
ment.  As Michael Rebell writes, public education was “rooted in republican
values . . . [and] a uniquely American innovation.”194  In this respect, regard-
185 Id.
186 N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII (ratified 1784) (“Knowledge and learning, gener-
ally diffused through a community . . . [is] essential to the preservation of a free
government . . . .”).
187 See Eastman, supra note 183, at 10.
188 Go & Lindert, supra note 20, at 3.
189 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 55.
190 See Go & Lindert, supra note 20, at 14.
191 Id. at 13.
192 Id. at 13–14.
193 Id. at 19–20; see also SILBEY, supra note 39, at 146 (indicating voting turnout rates
were lowest in slave states); Elisa Mariscal & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Schooling, Suffrage, and the
Persistence of Inequality in the Americas, 1800–1945, in POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 159, 159–217 (Stephen Haber ed., 2000).
194 REBELL, supra note 70, at 196 n.20.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 27 12-FEB-19 9:04
2019] the  fundamental  right  to  education 1085
less of how well Congress and the states expanded access to education, educa-
tion was embedded in the very concept of who we are as states and a nation.
In this respect, the Founders believed education was a necessary aspect of
liberty and ordered society.  Unsurprisingly, where implementation of that
idea was lacking, so too was a republican form of government.  It was this
failure that would later drive more aggressive and conclusive steps to ensure
education following the Civil War.
C. Transitioning from Theory to Reality: The Fourteenth Amendment Era
The national and state-level commitment to education became far more
concrete between the end of the Civil War and the final ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  As McDonald reveals, the most crucial inquiries are
in regard to the events surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly
evidence of deprivations of education, congressional efforts to address those
deprivations, the extent to which those prior efforts were incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment debates themselves,
and state actions and responses.  Each of these inquiries offers ample evi-
dence that education is a fundamental right.
1. Recognition of Education Deprivations Prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, congressional
and state leaders began to take special note of the deprivation of education
in various locations, particularly the South.195  They saw this deprivation as a
grievous wrong to both individuals and the nation as a whole.196  In the
South, African Americans had been completely denied formal learning and
even basic literacy was criminalized.197  Poor whites’ access to education was
more theoretical than real,198 demonstrated by the fact that white illiteracy
rates were more than four times higher in the South than the North.199  Con-
gressional and state leaders went so far as to argue that these education dep-
rivations worked an even larger harm—they allowed southern elites to
195 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner)
(assigning blame for the war on the lack of education and discussing high illiteracy rates);
2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 688–89 (same); id.
at 694–95 (same); see also CREMIN, supra note 41, at 149 (describing the southern education
system as “a patchwork”).
196 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1870) (statement of Sen.
Edmunds) (stating the aristocratic tendencies of the South and lack of general education
led to the war); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1867) (statement of Sen. Morton)
(asserting that without mass education, “the political power will remain almost entirely in
the hands of the present rebel-educated classes”).
197 See Wahl, supra note 38, at 17 n.51.
198 See CREMIN, supra note 41, at 149.
199 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
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dominate government and ultimately start a war that was adverse the interests
of the masses.200
2. Legislation to Address Education Deprivations Prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment
Congress began addressing these education deprivations in the years
immediately preceding the Fourteenth Amendment.  Congress funded a
massive expansion of educational opportunity in the South through the
Freedmen’s Bureau.  In fact, education became one of the primary functions
of the Bureau during Reconstruction.201  More importantly, through the
Reconstruction Act, Congress forced states to adopt their own constitutional
education clauses to ensure that access to education would further expand,
not recede.
In 1867, ten Confederate states had yet to rejoin the Union.202  The
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 1868 stated the terms upon which Congress
would readmit Confederate states to the Union.  Those terms explicitly
required that Southern states, among other things, adopt new state constitu-
tions that conformed to a republican form of government and the U.S. Con-
stitution.203  States were then to submit those constitutions to Congress,
which would determine whether they conformed.204
Congress would also express the view that public education is a central
component of a republican form of government.  Senator Charles Sumner
offered an amendment to the Reconstruction Act to make the provision of
education an explicit condition of readmission.  The amendment required
200 See id. (“[H]ad these States been more enlightened they would never have
rebelled. . . . A population that could not read and write naturally failed to comprehend
and appreciate a republican government.”); id. at 168 (statement of Sen. Morton) (argu-
ing that education of the masses was necessary to change the political balance in the
South); Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Education for All Maryland’s
Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD. L. REV.
1137, 1155 (1993); see also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1333 (1870) (statement of
Sen. Edmunds) (arguing that the lack of education had played a role in the War); 2 CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 688–89, 694–95 (delegates
arguing the same); WYTHE HOLT, VIRGINIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1901–1902,
at 254 (1990) (describing the Virginia elite’s perception of the state’s Reconstruction-era
constitution as threatening and dangerous).
201 CREMIN, supra note 41, at 517–18 (Reconstruction policy was educational policy and
“the very act of emancipation had carried ‘the sacred promise to educate.’” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting NAT’L TEACHERS’ ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS AND LECTURES OF THE SIXTH
ANNUAL MEETING 242 (Hartford, Office of the Am. Journal of Educ. 1865))); ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 144 (1988) (“Educa-
tion probably represented the [Freedmen’s Bureau’s] greatest success in the postwar
South.”).
202 See Harrison, supra note 51, at 412.
203 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.  The Act also required
states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and extend voting rights to African Americans.
Id.
204 Id.
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states “to establish and sustain a system of public schools open to all, without
distinction of race or color.”205  Sumner’s education amendment garnered
significant support and senators emphasized that education was necessary to
ensure African Americans became full citizens in the new South.206
Sumner’s amendment ultimately failed by the narrowest margin, by a
vote of 20–20.207  But the reference to race, rather than the general educa-
tion mandate, better explains this narrow defeat.  Sumner’s amendment
would have mandated an integrated or nondiscriminatory system of educa-
tion.  At least one of the no votes was based on an objection to integration,
not education in general.208  And others objected to the idea of placing
explicit advance conditions on readmission, regardless of what those condi-
tions might be.209  The notion that education was necessary to a republican
form of government drew no challenge at all.  In this context, the tie vote
over Sumner’s amendment is an enormous testament to just how strong the
commitment to requiring education was.  A full half of the Senate was willing
not only to mandate education, but to have former slaves and slave owners sit
down in those schools on equal footing.
The overall Reconstruction Act did pass and retained the provision
requiring states to submit their constitutions for congressional approval.210
Education remained one of Congress’s expectations regarding a republican
form of government.211  Senator Hendricks, who had voted against Sumner’s
amendment, later emphasized that Congress could rightfully reject state con-
stitutions that did not provide for education because they did not conform to
a republican form of government.212  Sumner also reiterated that senators
could and should vote against the readmission of any state that did not pro-
vide for education.213  While no formal vote was taken on the matter, those
who had voted in favor of integrated education, combined with Senator Hen-
dricks, comprised a majority in the Senate who understood education to be a
necessary aspect of a republican form of government.
205 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 581 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).  Sum-
ner explained that the amendment was a simple “safeguard for the future” and a natural
corollary to universal suffrage, which Congress was already requiring. Id. at 166–67 (state-
ment of Sen. Sumner).
206 See id. at 168 (statement of Sen. Morton); id. at 169 (statement of Sen. Cole).
207 Id. at 170.
208 Id. at 169–70 (statement of Sen. Williams) (posing a rhetorical question regarding
whether the amendment would require integration and then voting against it).
209 See id. at 148 (statement of Sen. Conkling); id. at 149 (statement of Sen. Sherman);
id. at 157 (statement of Sen. Hendricks); id. at 168 (statement of Sen. Hendricks) (“Con-
gress . . . has no power under the Constitution to make a constitution for a State . . . .”); see
also Harrison, supra note 51, at 419 n.227 (recounting senators’ concerns regarding condi-
tioning readmission).
210 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
211 See Black, supra note 22, at 781–83 (summarizing Congress’s acts and intentions).
212 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
213 Id. at 572 (statement of Sen. Sumner) (arguing that senators were “perfectly enti-
tled to . . . refuse to vote for such a constitution” that did not guarantee education).
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Further supporting this expectation is the fact that the Senate and
House had just passed legislation to monitor what states were doing in terms
of education.  Two weeks prior to the Senate debate over the Reconstruction
Act, Congress created a federal Department of Education.214  Its explicit pur-
pose was to “collect[ ] such statistics and facts as shall show the condition and
progress of education in the several States and Territories” and to use that
information to aid in the “establishment and maintenance of efficient school
systems, and otherwise promote the cause of education throughout the coun-
try.”215  In other words, before Congress even took up the explicit terms of
readmission, Congress had already laid the groundwork to assess whether
states were providing education to their citizens.  Congress, moreover, took
extensive affirmative steps to set up education systems itself in the South,
giving states a running start in carrying out Congress’s expectations.216
Most conclusive, however, was Congress’s action immediately following
the final ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  With the
Amendment formally in place, Congress explicitly conditioned the remain-
ing Confederate states’ readmission on the provision of public education.  In
the year before final ratification, nine Southern states drafted, debated, and
approved specific state constitutional language that mandated the provision
of public education.  Those states were readmitted in 1868.  Congress did
not, however, readmit the remaining states to the Union until 1870 and did
so under harsher terms: “[T]he constitution[s] of [Texas, Mississippi, and
Virginia] shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or
class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges
secured by the constitution[s] of said State[s].”217
3. The Fourteenth Amendment
Congress’s legislative acts prior to the Civil War were directly linked to
the final ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  When Congress
passed the Reconstruction Act, the Fourteenth Amendment was still eleven
votes short of the number necessary for ratification.218  Without the affirma-
tive votes of Southern states, the Fourteenth Amendment would not have
214 An Act to Establish a Department of Education, ch. 158, § 1, 14 Stat. 434, 434
(1867).
215 Id.
216 See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (1986) (discussing Congress’s land
grant education policy); CREMIN, supra note 41, at 516 (explaining the Freedmen’s
Bureau’s role in creating and funding new schools); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and
the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 780–81 (1985) (finding
two-thirds of Freedmen’s Bureau’s budget went to education).
217 See An Act to Admit the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress of the
United States, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (1870); An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to
Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870); An Act
to Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch.
10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870).
218 See Douglas H. Bryant, Comment, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 563–64 (2002).
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become part of the U.S. Constitution in 1868.219  And per the Reconstruc-
tion Act, Congress would not readmit states to the Union until they ratified
the Amendment.220
Added to this was the condition that Southern states adopt new state
constitutions that conformed to a republican form of government,221 which
included establishing systems of public education.  When the requisite num-
ber of states complied by enacting education clauses and ratifying the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Amendment became a formal addition to the
Constitution.222  Thus, at that very moment in time when the Amendment
was finally ratified, education had become a right of state citizenship in the
constitution of every readmitted state.223  This fact intersects with the Four-
teenth Amendment, which by its text, explicitly grants citizenship and pre-
vents the infringement of the rights of citizens.224  In short, without even
debating the question of whether education was a fundamental right or privi-
lege and immunity of citizenship, Congress took steps to ensure that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s newly recognized citizens would immediately have
access to their constitutional right to education.
Congress’s rationale for its action was clear: an educated citizenry is nec-
essary for a republican form of government.225  This rationale also directly
relates to the Court’s more amorphous substantive due process question of
whether a right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”226  Our Consti-
tution conceptualizes ordered liberty in terms of a republican form of gov-
ernment.227  Congress has, through its power to enforce a republican form
of government, practically defined ordered liberty as requiring states to pro-
vide public education.228  Without education, citizens cannot fully partici-
219 See id. at 565.
220 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
221 Id.
222 Proclamation No. 13, 15 Stat. 708, 710–11 (1868) (Secretary of State William
Seward).
223 ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of
1868, art. VIII, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art.
CXXXV; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 3.
224 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
225 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 167, 572 (1867) (statement Sen. Sum-
ner); id. at 168, 572 (statement of Sen. Morton); id. at 168 (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
226 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937).
227 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”); see also Daniel Walker Howe, Anti-Federal-
ist/Federalist Dialogue and Its Implications for Constitutional Understanding, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
2–3 (1989) (discussing the connection between republicanism and liberty in the eight-
eenth century).
228 See, e.g., An Act to Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation in the Congress
of the United States, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870) (requiring the continued provision of
education as a condition of Missouri’s readmission to the Union); see also Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989) (“[P]ublic schools . . . are a part and
parcel of our free institutions, woven into the very web and woof of popular govern-
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pate in self-government.229  And without guaranteeing education, a state
government could not be fully republican in form and, thus, fit to be
included in the Union.  This view of government, or ordered liberty, became
so entrenched that following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
no other state would ever enter the Union without an education clause.230
4. State Practices and Ratifications of the Fourteenth Amendment
Those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment were equally, if not
more, committed to constitutionalizing education.  In the span of just two
years, the Southern states that provided the final votes to ratify the Four-
teenth Amendment transformed themselves from a region in which educa-
tion was not guaranteed anywhere to one in which it was guaranteed
everywhere.  The state constitutional conventions began meeting immedi-
ately after Congress passed the Reconstruction Act,231 and demonstrated the
same clarity of vision regarding the importance of education.  Delegates to
the constitutional conventions consistently acknowledged that their task was
to create a republican form of government232 and that education was a nec-
essary component of that government.
Most state conventions established a committee to focus exclusively on
the creation of an education system.  The very act of devoting a committee
exclusively to this task reveals the primary importance of education in these
new constitutional schemes.  A typical state convention established several
committees, most of which focused on general issues of government bureau-
cracy and separation of powers.233  Voting and education tended to be the
only substantive subject matter specific committees in some states.234
ment . . . .” (quoting 3 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE KENTUCKY
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 4463 (Frankfort, E. Polk Johnson 1890))).
229 See supra notes 195–228.
230 ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2;
HAW. CONST. of 1959, art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (mandating “a general, uni-
form and thorough system of public, free common schools” to further “[t]he stability of a
republican form of government”); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XI, §§ 1, 7; NEB. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 147;
OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (mandating an education system as a
necessity of a republican form of government); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; WASH. CONST. art.
IX, §§ 1, 2; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
231 See, e.g., CYNTHIA E. BROWNE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: FROM INDEPEN-
DENCE TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENT UNION, 1776–1959: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 5, 39, 46,
80, 112, 167, 234 (1973).
232 1 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 10 (noting
that purpose of convention is “to frame a new Constitution” so as “to secure a Republican
form of Government”); id. at 628–807 (citing the second volume and referencing a repub-
lican form of government more than fifty times over seven days: February 29, March 2,
March 3, March 4, March 5, March 6, and  March 7).
233 See, e.g., 1 id. at 40.
234 Some states also had individual rights committees, but those focused on a litany of
narrow rights. See, e.g., id.
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Voting and education held this unique position because of their central-
ity to a republican form of government itself.  In proposing a robust
mandatory system of public education, the South Carolina convention’s com-
mittee on education, for instance, explained that education “is the surest
guarantee of the . . . preservation of the great principles of republican lib-
erty.”235  This sentiment was so widely shared across the state conventions
that the decision to constitutionally commit states to the creation of educa-
tion systems generated almost no debate at all.  When the question of the
mandate arose, delegates simply affirmed that education was necessary for a
republican form of government,236 and uneducated citizens could not carry
out their basic duties to the state.237
To the extent objections arose, they involved more nuanced issues
regarding whether, on the heels of war and economic implosion, states had
the capacity to finance education.238  Others raised concerns about the pros-
pect of racial equality in the schools.239  Concerns of this sort, however, did
not represent direct challenges to the creation of public education.  They
were concerns about how progressive and burdensome state policy on educa-
tion would be.
235 See id. at 264.
236 See, e.g., id. at 688 (citing the second volume and stating that compulsory education
was necessary for republican progress); id. at 691 (“[C]heap education is the best defence
of the State.”); see also DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITU-
TION FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS 500 (Little Rock, J.G. Price 1868) [hereinafter ARKANSAS
CONVENTION OF 1868] (arguing that access to education would give blacks the means to
“‘work their way up’ in the world” and “take their place . . . among the leaders of their
people”); id. at 683 (supporting the constitution because of its education mandate); OFFI-
CIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION, FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION FOR
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 200–01, 289 (New Orleans, J.B. Roudanez & Co. 1867–1868)
[hereinafter LOUISIANA CONVENTION OF 1868] (noting education was necessary because it
had been denied to African Americans for two centuries); JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 486 (providing
for county government to carry out the “Republican principle of local self-government”
and education).
237 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 695 (“If a
man is so ignorant as to know nothing of political economy of his State or country, he can
never be a good citizen.”); id. at 697 (noting that African American suffrage created “the
pressing necessity of their being educated to comprehend their new position, exercise
their new rights, and obey their new laws”).
238 See id. at 172–73 (citing the first volume); see also LOUISIANA CONVENTION OF 1868,
supra note 236, at 277 (expressing concerns over costs).
239 See, e.g., ARKANSAS CONVENTION OF 1868, supra note 236, at 498–500, 626–27; LOUISI-
ANA CONVENTION OF 1868, supra note 236, at 292; 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 692, 893–94 (supporting nondiscrimination); id. at 692,
701–02, 894 (questioning integration and compulsory education); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 91 (2009) (indicating that “[t]here was disa-
greement, however, about integrated schools”); Michael Robert Mounter, Richard Theodore
Greener and the African American Individual in a Black and White World, in AT FREEDOM’S
DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAR-
OLINA 130, 145 (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis Burke Jr. eds., 2000).
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The key insight from the education debates was not that some concerns
arose, but that issues as weighty as race and meager state finances were not
enough to dissuade states from enacting education clauses.240  If anything,
state conventions further strengthened their education clauses rather than
concede to these concerns.241  For instance, several state constitutions
included funding provisions that required certain resources to be devoted
exclusively to the support of education.242  Other states were even willing to
impose poll taxes, not to exclude voters, but to raise additional funds for
education.243  Several state constitutions even went so far as to mandate that
public schools be open to all244—a direct repudiation of the idea that
schools would be segregated.
The effort to rebuild republican forms of government through public
education was so overwhelming that it inverted the educational status quo.
Before the Civil War, affirmative education obligations were entirely missing
from Southern state constitutions.245  Three years after the Civil War, nine
240 See, e.g., 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 54, at 692,
696 (discussing the challenges of supporting education, but emphasizing its necessity in a
republican form of government); WILLIAMS, supra note 239, at 91 (indicating that “these
conventions produced ‘progressive documents’” that “established free public schools
(attendance was compulsory in some states)” (quoting ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE
STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 143–44 (2005))).
241 JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE
OF GEORGIA 482–83 (Augusta, E.H. Pughe 1868) (offering an amendment to strengthen
rather than weaken education clause by ensuring one or more schools in every district as
soon as possible); LOUISIANA CONVENTION OF 1868, supra note 236, at 60–61, 200–01
(including majority and minority reports, both of which agreed on the same core aspects
of delivering education to all the youth).
242 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 10 (providing that proceeds from all new
and old state lands “shall be inviolably appropriated to educational purposes”); id. art. XI,
§ 11 (requiring that one-fifth of general annual state revenues “be devoted exclusively to
the maintenance of public schools”); FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, §§ 4, 7 (devoting
resources to an education fund and requiring per-capita distribution among counties); see
also JOHN MATHIASON MATZEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR EDUCATION 129–39
(1931) (tracking the new common school funds in state constitutions).
243 GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI., § 3; James Lowell Underwood, African American Found-
ing Fathers: The Making of the South Carolina Constitution of 1868, in AT FREEDOM’S DOOR:
AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA,
supra note 239, at 1, 9–10.
244 ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6 (establishing education for “all the children of the
State”); ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1 (same); FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1 (same);
GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1 (same); LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art. CXXXV (“All
children of this State [of suitable age] shall be admitted to the public schools . . . without
distinction of race . . . .”); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2 (mandating an education
system for “all the children of the State”); S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. X, § 4 (same).
245 The most extensive support prior to the Civil War was found in Kentucky’s and
Tennessee’s constitutions, but they encouraged education rather than affirmatively man-
dating it. KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XI, § 1; TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. XI, § 10 (indicating
that the state shall “cherish literature and science” and “encourage[ ]” schools).  One
could read this as a weak constitutional mandate. See Calabresi & Perl, supra note 57, at
455–56.
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out of the ten Confederate states had enacted an affirmative education clause
in their constitution.246  Two years later, every Confederate state had enacted
an affirmative clause.  Moreover, the text of those education clauses included
the same concept found in Sumner’s proposed amendment to the Recon-
struction Act: the clauses mandated a system of public schools open to “all”
children.247
The same pattern occurred in newly formed states during this era.
Between 1864 and 1876, Nevada, Nebraska, and Colorado would enter the
Union as new states, all with education clauses.248  In the century following
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, thirteen new states sought
admission to the Union.249  Every single one included an education mandate
in their constitutions.250  Congress initially rejected the single petition for
statehood (from New Mexico) that did not include an education clause and
required the territory to revise its constitution to include one.251  In short,
once the Fourteenth Amendment became law, Congress never admitted
another state to the Union without an education clause.
















246 See ALA. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 6; ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1; FLA. CONST. of
1868, art. VIII, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. of 1868, tit. VII, art.
CXXXV; MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 2; S.C. CONST.
of 1868, art. X, § 3; TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. IX, § 1.
247 See supra note 246.
248 COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (ratified 1876); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (ratified 1875);
NEV. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 2 (ratified 1864).
249 See Martin Kelly, States and Their Admission to the Union, THOUGHTCO., https://www
.thoughtco.com/states-admission-to-the-union-104903 (last updated Feb. 8, 2018).
250 See INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES: A
DESKBOOK FOR THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT EDUCATION 161–96
(2008), https://www.pubintlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/EDU_50State.pdf
(summarizing the education clauses and their histories in each state).
251 Id. at 29.
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As the chart above reveals, the education clause pattern is even more
striking in comparison with the original states and colonies.  At the nation’s
founding, only five of thirteen state constitutions provided for education.252
On the eve of the Civil War, more than half of the nation’s states still failed to
affirmatively guarantee education.253  The complete reversal in Southern
constitutions during Reconstruction was enough by itself to create a new
supermajority of states with an education clause.  By 1868, 81% of all state
constitutions included an education clause.254  The admission of additional
new states, combined with revisions to constitutions in existing states, steadily
pushed that number higher.  By 1875, every state except Connecticut had an
education clause (although Connecticut did have an education system and a
constitutional provision that reserved certain funds to support it).255  Con-
necticut finally cured that technical defect in 1965.256
Data from the post–Civil War period also reveals how impactful these
clauses were in practical terms.  Public school enrollment increased dramati-
cally.  According to the National Center for Education Statistics, enrollment
increased by 44% during the 1870s.257  Enrollment continued to steadily rise
over the next few decades.258  Whereas the enrollment of school-aged chil-
dren hovered around 50% at the time of the Civil War, it reached 81% by
1910.259  The amount of time students spent in school also increased, with
the length of the school year and attendance rates growing substantially.260
In sum, education as a fundamental right has deep historic roots.  The
nation’s very concept of government was premised on an educated citizenry.
As a result, the United States, from its infancy, distinguished itself interna-
tionally with its expansion of education opportunity.  In those instances in
which the country failed to live up to its ideals, Congress eventually took
action to cure the problem. By the end of the Civil War, the inherent tension
between the national commitment to a republican form of government and
the reality of education opportunity in many states came to a head.  What
followed was a series of concerted congressional and state efforts to constitu-
tionalize education.  In just a few short years surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment, the provision of public education became a de facto right in
over three-quarters of the states and a uniform expectation for all moving
forward.  This history ranks education as fundamental at the time of the
252 See Eastman, supra note 183, at 3.
253 See Black, supra note 22, at 791.
254 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 57, at 460.
255 Id. at 458 n.132 (explaining that in 1875, New Jersey adopted its education clause,
leaving Connecticut as the only state without one).
256 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1280 (Conn. 1996) (explaining the 1965 amend-
ment to the state constitution to address school segregation).
257 William C. Sonnenberg, Elementary and Secondary Education, in NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 25,
25–26 (Thomas D. Snyder ed., 1993).
258 Id.
259 Id. at 26.
260 Id. at 27–28.
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Fourteenth Amendment.  Arguments to the contrary simply overlook this
crucial period, incorrectly looking to post-Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and
later eras for evidence of support of education.  Those periods do not estab-
lish the absence of a right, only that the previously established right was
being violated—most often for racist reasons.261
III. QUALITATIVE DEMAND
The recognition of a fundamental right involves two distinct inquiries:
(a) whether a right exists, and (b) the scope of the right.  Part II demon-
strated that education is a fundamental right, but the question remains as to
its scope.  The right to bear arms, again, provides a straightforward roadmap
for this second question.  The Supreme Court in McDonald held that a right
existed and was enforceable against states.262  In District of Columbia v. Heller,
the Court examined the precise meaning and scope of a right to “keep and
bear arms.”263  The right could have been as narrow as a right of militiamen
to keep the specific types of weapons that they would use in battle or as broad
as any individual’s right to keep weapons of their choice for self-defense.264
The answer to the scope question is the key to drawing lines regarding
whether state laws invade a fundamental right.
Questions of scope are a particularly significant barrier for the right to
education.  A court could easily accept the general idea that students have a
constitutional right to education, but the scope of the right to education
inherently involves complex and substantive judgments.  These uncertainties
can dissuade a court from recognizing the right at all, even if evidence exists
to support the right.265  As state court decisions reveal, legislative history at
best provides only vague outlines of the scope of the right.266  This means
that a court that recognizes a right to education will be called on to draw
inferences regarding scope that will have enormous practical conse-
quences.267  A broad education right will draw courts into wholesale evalua-
tions of educational quality on a statewide level,268 whereas a limited right
261 See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004).
262 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
263 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–600 (2008).
264 Compare id. at 582, with id. at 609.
265 See, e.g., Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400, 408 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam) (finding no “judicially discoverable [or] manageable
standards”); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996) (same).
266 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205–06 (Ky. 1989)
(examining constitutional debates).
267 See, e.g., id. at 212–13 (defining the scope of the right to education after examining
several sources on the meaning of uniform an efficient education); Leandro v. State, 488
S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (defining the scope of a sound basic education).
268 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214 (declaring the entire school system
unconstitutional).
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can preclude the vast majority of education challenges plaintiffs might
raise.269
More specifically, a right to education can be defined as requiring abso-
lute equity, a high-quality level of education, a minimally adequate educa-
tion, mere access to education, or only good faith efforts to support
education.  Each of these permutations raises additional questions.  What are
the aspects of education to which these concepts apply?  Do these concepts
apply only to major categories like school funding and teacher competency,
or do they apply to more granular aspects like class size, technology, and
school district boundaries?
The Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez indicated
that the lack of guideposts was a significant reason for why it would not inter-
vene.270  In the four decades since Rodriguez, state supreme courts have made
enormous strides in fleshing out the scope of education rights and duties
under their state constitutions.271  Some scholars argue that these state court
decisions offer guideposts for a floor of educational opportunity that a fed-
eral right could demand.272  Scholars also point to the vast expansion of fed-
eral education statutes, centralized curricula, and the expectations embodied
in standardized tests as providing additional manageable standards.273
Whatever the intrinsic merits of these sources, it would be a mistake to
rely primarily on them.  First, they put the Court in the position of making an
open-ended policy-based inquiry from which the current Court is likely to
recoil.  The Court would, in effect, be forced to draw inferences based on an
evolving modern common law.  The identification of a historical fundamen-
tal right to education cannot simply become the predicate for the Court to
take over, modernize, and federalize education.
Second, the history surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment provides
its own guideposts for the scope of the right.  Supreme Court precedent,
moreover, indicates that this history is the first point of departure in identify-
ing a right’s scope.274  Where a precise constitutional term is available (such
as the right to bear arms), the Court has recently looked for the original
plain meaning of the constitutional text, relying on congressional purpose,
269 See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 927 So. 2d 426, 431
(La. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting claim because the state constitution only requires the state
to adopt a funding formula and does not require it to develop a formula that addresses
costs or particular items).
270 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
271 See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law,
65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1325–26 (1992) (applauding state court developments in defining
adequacy).
272 See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 12, at 814–22; Kristen Safier, Comment, The Question of a
Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 1018–20 (2001).
273 See, e.g., Black, supra note 77, at 1393–95; Ratner, supra note 12; Michael A. Rebell,
The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 54 (2012).
274 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–600 (2008) (examining the
historical meaning of the right to bear arms).
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dictionaries, and common usage of the time.275  In the absence of constitu-
tional language (as with the right to marry or procreate), the Court relies
more heavily on historical practices and traditions.276  The Court also tests
the logic of competing meanings and practices against the purpose and func-
tion of the right.277
Even if the word education were in the Constitution, definitions alone
would do little to resolve the scope of the right.  Webster’s 1828 American
Dictionary defines education in terms of “instruction and discipline which is
intended to enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form the
manners and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in their future sta-
tions.”278  This definition simply begs the question of what “stations” students
were to prepare for, as each calls for a different level of understanding.  Yet,
this definition does reinforce how important the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ pur-
pose for education is in discerning the scope of a right to education.  With-
out a purpose or goal, the scope of a right to education may be practically
impossible to identify.  Consistent with this logic, the Court’s analysis in cases
like Heller is dominated by inquiries into purpose.279
As Section III.A details, the historical record provides relatively clear
answers to the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ purpose in guaranteeing education.
They were confronting a specific set of problems—the entrenched effects of
slavery, illiteracy, and disenfranchisement—with a specific goal in mind: pre-
paring the population at large for citizenship in a republican form of govern-
ment.  Historical practices and traditions then provide the depth regarding
the type of education citizens needed in a republican form of government.
As Section III.B details, the United States’ republican form of government
required that citizens possess a set of skills and competencies, largely
grounded in literacy and critical thinking, that would allow them to engage
in self-rule through the ballot.  More specifically, citizens required the ability
to comprehend, evaluate, and act thoughtfully on the functions and policies
of government.
A. The Framers’ and Ratifiers’ Intent
1. Preparing Individuals for Citizenship in a Republican Form of
Government
The most basic goal was to prepare individuals to take their place as
citizens.  The Fourteenth Amendment had just declared all persons born and
naturalized in the United States to be citizens.  This meant that nearly four
million African Americans, whom the Supreme Court had previously
275 See id.
276 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–97 (2015).
277 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (“Logic demands that there be a link between the stated
purpose and the command.”).
278 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York,
S. Converse 1828) (defining “education”).
279 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–92.
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excluded from citizenship, would be immediately ushered into the body poli-
tic.280  In six southern states, African Americans were more than forty per-
cent of the population, reaching as high as fifty-seven percent in South
Carolina.281  In another five southern states, African Americans were twenty-
four to thirty-three percent of the population.282  Substantial numbers of illit-
erate whites were also expected to begin participating in government, as the
South transitioned from elitist to egalitarian.
The education clauses that states enacted clearly articulated citizenship
as the motivating purpose.  In a comprehensive treatment of the subject,
Michael Rebell writes: “[T]he text and the legislative history of these clauses
reflect the strong commitment of the nation’s founders and of the architects
of the common schools to the need to ensure that all students be prepared to
function as capable citizens in a democratic society.”283  Drawing on this his-
tory, state supreme courts have likewise recognized this citizenship goal.
Thirty-two have explicitly found that “preparation for capable citizenship is
the prime purpose or a primary purpose of the education clause of their state
constitutions.”284
By citizenship, Congress and the states meant citizenship in our republi-
can government.  The Founders believed our republican form of govern-
ment required more than just nominal voters.285  Citizens needed to discern
their own interests and those of the common good.286  They would then
select leaders who could carry out that vision.287  Consistent with the theme
of the common good, the Founders believed citizens had a duty to vote.288
The relationship between the government and its citizens was reciprocal.
Government owes certain responsibilities to its citizens, but citizens owed
responsibility to their government as well.289  Those duties included voting,
serving on juries, and participating in self-government.290
280 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MAP SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION




283 REBELL, supra note 70, at 4–5.
284 Id. at 5–6, 55–56 (citing numerous state supreme court cases).
285 See, e.g., Botstein, supra note 67, at 60; DeFleur, supra note 64, at 74.
286 See DeFleur, supra note 64, at 74; James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-
Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 116–20 (2000) (detailing the
Madisonian theory that voters would pursue the common good).
287 See Gardner, supra note 286, at 116–20.
288 See BARTON, supra note 174, at 334–35.
289 See generally EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 50 (1996); OUR AGELESS CONSTITUTION 172–75 (W.
David Stedman & LaVaughn G. Lewis eds., 1987) (describing the responsibility of citizens
and discussing the decline of the “consciousness of responsibility” since the founding).
290 References to jury service pale in comparison to the duty to vote, but logic and
evidence indicate that citizens needed some level of education to fulfill their duty as jurors.
That serving on a jury is a duty of citizenship is beyond question.  Rebell makes a compel-
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The Founders were convinced that this form of government required an
intelligent and educated electorate.291  Uninformed and uncomprehending
masses would, at best, fail to carry out their nominal duties and remain inca-
pable of discerning the public good.  At worst, they would pursue their own
narrow interests or fall prey to manipulations.  This misguided power could
be used, for instance, to infringe the property rights of the wealthy.  In short,
the republican form of government to which the Founders aspired would rise
or fall on its ability to expand the intelligence of its citizenry.292
2. The Reciprocal Relationship Between the “Qualified Voter” and His
Right to Education
The clearest evidence of the expectation for intelligent voting is in the
concept of the “qualified voter.”  While voter qualifications have certainly
been misused in this country,293 their underlying merit is premised on the
notion that voters must exercise the ballot intelligently.  And ironically, the
validity of the government efforts to enforce this expectation rests on the
government’s willingness to educate its citizens.  Logic dictates that a govern-
ment cannot fairly call itself republican if it indefinitely excludes large num-
bers of citizens from voting who have never had the opportunity to receive
education.294  Thus, a republican form of government must take affirmative
steps to educate its citizens.
ling argument that jury duty, likewise, requires intelligent citizens. See REBELL, supra note
70, at 52.
291 See supra notes 168–87 and accompanying text.
292 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (ratified 1874) (mandating education because
“[i]ntelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and the bulwark of a free and
good government”); IND. CONST. of 1816, art. IX, § 1 (“Knowledge and learning, generally
diffused through a community . . . [are] essential to the preservation of a free govern-
ment . . . .”); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (ratified 1857) (“The stability of a republican form
of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty
of the Legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools.”); N.H.
CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII (ratified 1784) (“Knowledge and learning . . . [are] essential to
the preservation of a free government . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (ratified 1889)
(mandating education because “[a] high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and
morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order
to insure the continuance of that government”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 205–06 (Ky. 1989) (positing that Kentucky’s constitutional convention of 1890
justified the education clause as essential to freedom, developing patriotism, and under-
standing government); REBELL, supra note 70, at 5 (“[A]n educated populace was viewed as
a means of survival for the democratic principles of the state.” (quoting the Wyoming
Supreme Court)).
293 Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of Voter
Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370, 370–72 (1991).
294 Black’s Law Dictionary defines republican government as one “chosen by the peo-
ple.” Republican Government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  The extent to
which the government is actually chosen by the people depends on the extent to which the
people are able to vote.  John Hart Ely explains that equal protection’s prohibition on
voting discrimination is linked to principles regarding a republican form of government.
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Literacy tests have historically served as a rough proxy for voters’ ability
to cast their ballot intelligently.  As Arthur Bromage would remark of the
post–Civil War period that expanded the right to vote: “The literacy test may
not be a panacea, but at least it is practical.  A test of civic competence before
admitting an individual to the electorate, even if desirable, is not feasible.”295
These tests, of course, have also intertwined with racist motivations to
exclude minorities,296 but the tests are not limited to those motivations.  The
first push for literacy tests came well before the mass enfranchisement of
blacks.
For instance, New York’s constitutional convention of 1846 debated a
reading and writing requirement for voters.297  While that measure failed, a
similar one passed nine years later in Connecticut.298  It was not until post-
Reconstruction that literacy tests would be so clearly aimed at African Ameri-
can voters.  Prior to then, some Southern literacy tests were aimed at remov-
ing illiterate whites and blacks from the electorate.299  The proponents
feared unlearned and reactive white voters, as well as former slaves.300
Problems later became widespread because Southern officials administered
the tests in discriminatory manner, not because the tests were inherently
invalid.301
Outside the South, literacy tests would emerge as a means to “reduce[ ]
the political influence of immigrants, poor, and the ‘uninformed.’”302  Eth-
nic bias would play a role in the North as well,303 but so too would the notion
that some baseline of knowledge and education were appropriate qualifica-
tions to vote.  New York, in fact, structurally links literacy, education, and
voting.  For a period of years, the education system controlled the literacy
and knowledge requirement.304  Voters demonstrated their qualifications by
either completing a course of study in the school system or passing an exam
administered by the school system.305
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121–23
(1980).
295 Arthur W. Bromage, Literacy and the Electorate, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 946, 949 (1930).
296 Cunningham, supra note 293, at 370–72.
297 See Bromage, supra note 295, at 950.
298 Id.
299 See Cunningham, supra note 293, at 373–74.
300 See id.
301 Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (distinguish-
ing between racial inequality in administering a literacy test and the validity of the test
itself); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366 (1915) (positing that literacy tests are “the
exercise by the State of a lawful power vested in it not subject to our supervision, and
indeed, its validity is admitted”).
302 John E. Filer et al., Voting Laws, Educational Policies, and Minority Turnout, 34 J.L. &
ECON. 371, 374 (1991).
303 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES 145–46 (2000); Bromage, supra note 295, at 952.
304 See Bromage, supra note 295, at 957–61.
305 See id.
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In the absence of racial or ethnic bias, the Supreme Court has held that
literacy tests are generally constitutional.  Its rationale mirrors that of the
Founders.  Just five years after deciding Brown v. Board of Education, the Court
in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections306 wrote:
The ability to read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed to
promote intelligent use of the ballot. . . . Literacy and intelligence are obvi-
ously not synonymous.  Illiterate people may be intelligent voters.  Yet in our
society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter can-
vass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who
are literate should exercise the franchise.  It was said last century in Massa-
chusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an “independent and
intelligent” exercise of the right of suffrage.307
The Court validated the general constitutional legitimacy of restricting the
ballot to intelligent voters and relying on literacy to do so.
The general legitimacy of such a restriction, however, rests not simply on
nondiscrimination, but on education as a fundamental right.  While the
Court did not address the issue, government and citizens have reciprocal
duties.  The legitimacy of literacy and knowledge requirements in a republi-
can form of government rests on the government taking on the duty to edu-
cate its citizens to the extent necessary for them to cast their votes
intelligently.308  Otherwise, the exclusion of voters becomes an illegitimate
exercise of power by the government (or its literate citizens) over disadvan-
taged citizens.  The exercise of power could also become countermajori-
tarian depending on the rigor of the qualifications.
The Supreme Court has never expressly acknowledged the logic of a
reciprocal duty, but it hints at it with its descriptions of education.  As the
Court wrote in Ambach v. Norwick, “Public education, like the police function,
‘fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constitu-
ency.’”309  State courts are far more forceful on this point.  The Vermont
Supreme Court wrote: “[T]he Education Clause assumes paramount signifi-
cance in the constitutional frame of government established by the framers:
it expressed and incorporated ‘that part of republican theory which holds
education essential to self-government and which recognizes government as
the source of the perpetuation of the attributes of citizenship.’”310  Although
less eloquently, numerous other state supreme courts offer a similar explana-
tions of why their states adopted education clauses and why the state must
now prepare individuals for their roles as citizens, particularly in the intelli-
306 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
307 Id. at 51–52 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Stone v. Smith, 34 N.E.
521, 521 (Mass. 1893)).
308 See supra notes 172–79 and accompanying text.
309 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291, 297 (1978)).
310 Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting Allen W.
Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law,
18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 97–98 (1989)).
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gent exercise of the vote.311  In short, the foregoing logic binds together the
Founders’ belief that citizens have a duty to vote, the duty must be exercised
intelligently, and states have a duty to provide education to their citizens.  It
is no surprise then that Congress acted pursuant to the republican form of
government guarantee to demand that all states provide education following
the Civil War.
B. A Common Understanding of Educated Citizenship
If the purpose of a fundamental right to education is to prepare individ-
uals for self-government in our republican form of government, what then
are the specific skills and knowledge that citizens need?  The answer to that
question represents the measures for identifying the qualitative scope of a
fundamental right to education.  The most historically honest qualitative
measures can be found in an examination of how citizens actually partici-
pated in self-government prior to and immediately following the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Their participation, or at least intelligent participation,
required far more than just casting a vote or the basic ability to read.  As a
function of the times, participation required a relatively high level of literacy
and engagement, as self-government involved an ongoing and active public
dialogue that took place in print.  Voting was simply the final culmination of
that participation.  Moreover, citizens often voted on matters far more impor-
tant than electing their officials.  They were regularly called to reform gov-
ernment itself, voting on new state constitutions and amendments.
1. Print-Based Self-Government
Self-government, particularly at the federal level, was almost entirely
print based at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Newspapers and
pamphlets were the dominant, and often exclusive, medium through which
citizens understood their government.312  Print-based materials were the
means through which citizens learned of, debated, and understood public
policy.313  As Margaret DeFleur explains, the only way citizens, particularly
those living in rural settings, could learn of and stay appraised of what their
representative had done or were about to do in Washington, D.C. was to read
it in the newspapers.314  Newspapers, as a consequence, became the de facto
public forum.  Insofar as one exercised the First Amendment right to receive
and dispense political information and debate, it was through the newspa-
311 See REBELL, supra note 70, at 56–59.
312 See DeFleur, supra note 64, at 70.
313 See Thomas David Bunting, A Bible, an Ax, and a Tablet: Tocqueville’s Newspapers and
Everyday Political Discourse, 46 PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 257, 258–60 (2017); DeFleur, supra note
64, at 70.
314 See DeFleur, supra note 64, at 70; see also Carwardine, supra note 65, at 4.
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pers.315  Thus, the ability to read, for all practical matters, was necessary to
enter the body politic.
As agrarian as the American population was, it was very politically
attuned.  The general public had an insatiable appetite for newspapers.
Between 1800 and 1860, the number of newspapers in print grew from 1200
to 3000, and the total combined circulation of these papers doubled.316  The
circulation set the nation apart.  “Americans of the Civil War era read more
and cheaper newspapers, and enjoyed a greater choice of daily and weekly
titles, than the citizens of any other nation.”317  To be clear, newspapers
devoted much of their content to sensationalism, but much of it was political.
Moreover, the level of political information and discourse in the papers
reflected the United States’ status as the “world’s first mass democracy.”318
Tocqueville, for instance, reasoned that the widespread consumption of
newspapers in the United States leveled down political power from elites to
the average citizen, which made America more egalitarian and less like aristo-
cratic Europe.319
Newspapers were the principal means through which government spoke
to its citizens.  Outside the ballot box, newspapers were, in effect, the link
that bound government to its citizens.  Presidents used newspapers as their
central mechanism to speak regularly and directly to the electorate and
shape public opinion.320  Since at least Andrew Jackson, individual newspa-
pers served as the President’s official “organ” and until the Buchanan presi-
dency received government patronage.321  Presidents, of course, gave public
speeches, but the most significant impact of those speeches was in their
reprinting.  Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address demonstrates the point best.  His
remarks were underwhelming and overshadowed in person, but when
printed and circulated, they redefined what the Civil War meant to the
nation.322
Lincoln’s learned use of the papers, moreover, revealed how central the
printed word was to self-government in a time of crisis.  Rather than using an
315 Tocqueville draws a tight connection between newspapers and citizens’ First
Amendment freedoms. See 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 697.
316 See FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF NEWSPAPERS IN THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH 250 YEARS, 1690 to 1940, at 216 (1941); DAN SCHILLER, OBJECTIV-
ITY AND THE NEWS: THE PUBLIC AND THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL JOURNALISM 12 (1981).
317 Carwardine, supra note 65, at 3.
318 Id.; see also 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 55.
319 See Bunting, supra note 313, at 261.
320 See Carwardine, supra note 65, at 9–10.
321 Erik McKinley Eriksson, The Establishment and Rise of the Washington Globe: A
Phase of Jacksonian Politics 1 (June 1921) (unpublished M.A. thesis, College of the State
University of Iowa), https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4208&context=etd.
322 See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 35, 38
(1992).
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“official organ” to manipulate public opinion or distort the truth,323 Presi-
dent Lincoln believed that direct and truthful communication through the
papers would save our republic.  Lincoln
belie[ved] that it was the citizen’s exercise of reason which would ensure the
Union’s ultimate victory. . . . Even in the darkest days he professed his con-
tinuing faith in the people: “Let them know the truth, and the country is
safe.” . . . [Even] in wartime [he] remained convinced of “the power of the
right word from the right man to develop the latent fire and enthusiasm of
the masses.” . . . In setting out his evolving purposes and policies Lincoln
chiefly used the printed word.324
Political parties also relied heavily on newspapers to perform a variety of
functions.  A contemporaneous commentator explained that “[n]ewspapers
are to political parties in this country what working tools are to the operative
mechanic.”325  Scholars further observe that “newspapers acted as ligaments,
connecting scattered party loyalists, especially those living in rural isolation
and small towns, and giving them a sense of participating in a wider, even
national, political community.”326
Newspapers were so important to the growth and operation of our
democracy that Congress itself supplemented their transmission.327  The Pos-
tal Service Act of 1792 subsidized the delivery of newspapers, reducing news-
paper delivery rates to just a fraction of the standard rate.328  The Postal
Service also allowed editors to ship their newspapers to one another free of
charge.329  This practice encouraged and allowed for the easy republication
of news stories nationwide.330  As two scholars observe, the Post Office was
the first central government agency, and by “facilitat[ing] the expansion of
the press,” it “shaped political developments.”331
In sum, citizens’ ability to intelligently cast their votes depended almost
entirely on their ability to engage a robust set of print materials.  The exis-
tence of those materials alone distinguished our nation.  Political leaders at
all levels of government relied on those materials and sought to ensure wide
access to them.  But as the next subsection of this Article demonstrates, citi-
zenship entailed more than just the avid consumption of newspapers.
323 See, e.g., ANDREW W. ROBERTSON, THE LANGUAGE OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL RHETO-
RIC IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN, 1790–1900, at 68–82 (1995) (detailing the various
slogans and rhetoric used by the parties and Presidents to persuade the public).
324 Carwardine, supra note 65, at 14 (footnote omitted).
325 SILBEY, supra note 39, at 54 (quoting Rep. Jabez Hammond).
326 Carwardine, supra note 65, at 4.
327 See Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, A Reminder of Precedents in Subsidizing Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/business/media/28subsidy.html.
328 Postage Rates for Periodicals: A Narrative History, U.S. POSTAL SERV. (June 2010), https:/
/about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/periodicals-postage-history.htm.
329 Newspapers and Journals During the Civil War Era, PEOPLE’S CONTEST, https://peoples
contest.psu.edu/newspapers-and-journals-during-civil-war-era (last visited Nov. 22, 2018).
330 See id.
331 THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY
9–10 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003).
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2. Opinion Formation and Government Accountability
Newspapers and other print medium served a function beyond just
information.  They were the mechanism through which citizens formed opin-
ions about government and ultimately held it accountable.  This process is, of
course, difficult to precisely measure, but the prevailing practices of the time
provide extensive evidence from which to draw inferences about the level of
literacy skills and knowledge our republican form of government would have
required.  The most pertinent information indicates that citizenship required
relatively high-level critical literacy, knowledge, and reflection.
As part of a “systematic and large-scale qualitative research project” on
American politics, James Bryce traveled extensively throughout the United
States in the post–Civil War period.332  His highly regarded book, The Ameri-
can Commonwealth, examined the design and function of state, local, and fed-
eral government in the United States.333  The Supreme Court, in fact, has
relied on Bryce interpreting the Constitution when questions of historical
practice have arisen.334  In his private capacity, Chief Justice William Howard
Taft further wrote of Bryce: “He knew us better than we know ourselves, and
he went about and among us and gave us the boon of his illuminating wis-
dom derived from the lessons of the past.”335
Bryce found that the ongoing formation of public opinion, not the mere
casting of a ballot, was the mechanism that held the United States govern-
ment accountable on a day-to-day basis.336  Unlike other countries, United
States officials are always set to come before the voters after some relatively
short and preordained point in time and be held accountable for their
actions.337  The effect was preemptive.  Representatives monitored and
responded to public opinion well before elections were held.338  Bryce wrote:
“Towering over presidents and state governors, over Congress and state legis-
latures, over conventions and the vast machinery of party, public opinion
stands out, in the United States, as the great source of power, the master of
servants who tremble before it.”339
Public opinion developed through an ongoing dialectic between citizens
in the newspapers.340  American voters read about events, interpreted them
based on their own predispositions, formed an initial position, followed the
332 DeFleur, supra note 64, at 66–67.
333 Id.
334 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1981) (noting Bryce and Toc-
queville are “astute foreign observers of our system . . . during the first century of the
Nation’s existence”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 296 (1897) (noting that Bryce is
“an English writer of high authority” who wrote the “admirable work on the American
Commonwealth”).
335 1 BRYCE, supra note 66, at xi.
336 See, e.g., id. at 132–33, 344, 362; id. at 923 (citing the second volume).
337 Id. at 924–28 (citing the second volume).
338 Id.
339 Id. at 923.
340 Id. at 929–38.
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debates in the papers, sharpened their positions, saw those positions
reflected in political candidates, and then voted.341  Joel Silbey similarly con-
cludes of the pre–Civil War period: “When the people voted, they demon-
strated how well they had absorbed the main elements defining the political
nation and understood the significance of the parties’ distinctive rhetoric,
how much they had internalized political culture, and what their best calcula-
tion was of how to attain their own particular goals.”342  This accountability
loop was not happenstance.  It was an outgrowth of the U.S. form of govern-
ment, the expansion of the right to vote, the literacy of citizens, and the
proliferation of newspapers.343
Tocqueville, who is also well-regarded by the Court for his insights on
nineteenth-century practices,344 went a step further, describing citizens’
interaction with newspapers as necessary to preserve basic freedom and lib-
erty.345  Papers allowed citizens to come together in common causes both for
and against government.346  Without the public forum that papers offered,
individuals were largely powerless and subject to the tyranny of the major-
ity.347  But through papers, “the oppressed citizen [can exercise his] one
means of defense: he can appeal to the nation as a whole, and if it is deaf, to
humanity at large.”348  Tocqueville found this dynamic to be especially
important in the United States, where even the lowliest members of society
were literate and engaged in the formation of public opinion.349  The net
effect was an egalitarian exercise of power consistent with our form of gov-
ernment.350  In short, these studies and reflections on American political cul-
ture demonstrate not only a highly literate and engaged electorate, they
demonstrate that literacy and the ongoing written dialogue between citizens
341 See DeFleur, supra note 64, at 75–76.  Final votes cast at the ballot box are “a result
of a long process of awareness, discussion, debate, controversy, and final opinion structur-
ing.” Id. at 77.
342 SILBEY, supra note 39, at 142.
343 2 BRYCE, supra note 66, at 923 (writing that America has marched “unconsciously as
well as consciously” toward the goal of “the extension of the suffrage, the more rapid diffu-
sion of news, and the practice of self-government itself” and as a result “[n]o other peo-
ple . . . stands so near” self-government).
344 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1981).
345 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 697–98 (describing the press as “the democratic
weapon of freedom” and a singular “means of defense”).
346 Id. at 517–18; see also id. at 519 (“Newspapers do not multiply simply because they
are cheap, but according to the more or less frequent need felt by a great number of
people to communicate with one another and act together.”).
347 See Bunting, supra note 313, at 257–62.
348 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 697.
349 See Bunting, supra note 313, at 257, 261 (summarizing Tocqueville’s findings of the
high levels of literacy in the United States among all citizens and the levelling down effect
it had on political power).
350 Id. at 258–59, 261 (“The free press was not just for elites; it was a weapon for every-
one in a democratic society. Anyone could make grievances publicly . . . .”).  Tocqueville
was surprised to find that newspapers reached from remote frontier farmers to common
laborers in the cities.  1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 305.
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and leaders lay at the very heart of the government we had formed.  Absent
the capacity to engage in that dialogue, the nation may very well have resem-
bled something far different.
3. A Constitution-Making Era
Finally, the pre– and post–Civil War period was an incredible time of
constitution making at both the federal and state level.  That all-important
task of self-government presupposed and required a high level of literacy and
governmental understanding.351  This fact is easily overlooked, as scholars
and courts canvas the Framers’ thoughts and writings.  The Framers, how-
ever, sought the assent of the states and the people within them.  The
Famers’ writings are important not only in what they said, but also in what
they tell us about the audience to whom they were directed.
The Federalist Papers are telling on this score.  Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay wrote eighty-five essays arguing the merits of
our Constitution.352  Their stated audience was “the People of the State of
New York.”353  The content of those essays presumed that critical reading
and literacy was “the proper standard of literacy for democratic participa-
tion.”354  And newspaper editors believed that such an audience existed.
New York City’s newspapers published nearly all of the essays within the span
of a year, and a number of essays were also republished in Virginia, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.355
Citizens’ interaction with the Federal Constitution, however, pales in
comparison to the demands of state constitutions.  State constitutional con-
ventions, in many instances, called for the direct approval by citizens.  This
was arguably the highest act of citizenship and, by its nature, required that
citizens make a substantive judgment about the form and function of govern-
ment.  They could not simply cast their ballot in favor of a politician to carry
out their general wishes.  Citizens would typically vote to call a constitutional
convention, elect delegates to those conventions to propose a draft constitu-
tion, and then vote on the final draft.  And, of course, debates over the merits
of these constitutions would be fought out in newspapers.
These state constitutional conventions, moreover, occurred on a fre-
quent basis, particularly in the period surrounding the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  All the Southern states would adopt entirely new constitutions during
Reconstruction.  And as the country expanded westward, new territories
would also hold constitutional conventions as part of the process of becom-
ing a state.  And to be clear, a convention could occur several times during a
citizen’s lifetime.  Many Southern states called three to four conventions dur-
351 See, e.g., Botstein, supra note 67, at 60–61.
352 Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist
Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 453 n.22 (1996).
353 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
354 Botstein, supra note 67, at 60.
355 Elaine F. Crane, Publius in the Provinces: Where Was The Federalist Reprinted Outside
New York City?, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 589, 589–590 (1964).
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ing the second half of the nineteenth century.356  Other state constitutions
included provisions for automatically recurring conventions every decade or
two.357  Western states typically took a different approach, allowing citizens
to amend the constitution through a referendum rather than a conven-
tion.358  In short, constitutional conventions and amendments were part of
the regular life of a citizen during the second half of the 1800s.
The constitutions and other documents that citizens considered and
voted on were, of course, complex.  The U.S. Constitution was, for instance,
written at what would be college reading level today.359  State constitutions
were typically longer and at least equally complex.360  The complexity of
texts, moreover, was not unique in comparison to other political texts.  Presi-
dential speeches of the time (which were also reprinted) were written at just
as high a level.361  Lincoln even wrote the Gettysburg Address at an eleventh-
grade reading level.362
4. A Substantive Standard for a Citizen’s Education
The Framers’ purpose in guaranteeing education combined with the
actual demands, expectations, and prevailing practices of citizenship at the
time provide a basis upon which to meaningfully define the scope of a right
to education.  As the forgoing Sections demonstrate, the Framers sought to
enshrine a right to education with a specific end in mind: the preparation of
individuals for citizenship in a republican form of government.  They did so
for three reasons.  First, they believed it was the duty of citizens to vote.363
Second, effective self-government required educated voters.364  Third, gov-
ernment could only demand educated voting if government carried out its
356 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 5 (William F. Swin-
dler ed., 1979) (listing constitutional conventions in Virginia in 1864, 1870); id. at 417
(1973) (citing the second volume and listing Georgia conventions in 1861, 1865, 1868,
1877); 8 id. at 447 (1979) (listing South Carolina conventions in 1865, 1868, 1895).
357 See also N.H. CONST. art. XCIX, § C (repealed 1980) (vote on the necessity of a new
convention every seven years); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art XIII, § 2 (constitutional convention
possible every twenty years).
358 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 51 (1989).
359 Jason Kottke, The Reading Level of Presidential Speeches, KOTTKE.ORG (Oct. 10, 2014),
https://kottke.org/14/10/the-reading-level-of-presidential-speeches; Derek Thompson,
Presidential Speeches Were Once College-Level Rhetoric—Now They’re for Sixth-Graders, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/10/have-presiden
tial-speeches-gotten-less-sophisticated-over-time/381410/.
360 See, e.g., VA. CONST. of 1870, in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS, supra note 34, at 3871–904 (containing twelve arti-
cles and exceeding thirty pages).
361 See Kottke, supra note 359; Thompson, supra note 359.
362 Lee Drutman, Is Congress Getting Dumber, or Just More Plainspoken?, SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(May 21, 2012), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2012/05/21/grade-level-congress/.
363 See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
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duty to ensure citizens’ access to education.365  Thus, the extension of a right
to education was an act of self-preservation by the government and its people.
The intelligent exercise of the ballot involved far more than casting a
ballot.  It required a high level of literacy and political engagement.  The
relationship between government, representatives, and the people was almost
entirely print based.366  The written word was citizens’ primary, if not only,
means of understanding their government, consistently holding it accounta-
ble, resisting its overreach, and compelling it toward representative poli-
cies.367  Citizens engaged this print dialectic rapaciously.368  These literate
aspects of our nation were manifestations of our form of government itself
and set the nation apart from others.369  It allowed our citizens to not only
participate in an ongoing political dialogue,370 it allowed them to actually
form and reform their government through constitutions on a regular
basis.371
If the Framers sought to guarantee education for citizenship in a repub-
lican form of government, these are the skills and expectations they would
have had for that education.  Thus, a substantive standard for a fundamental
right to education emerges from history itself.  That standard can be reduced
to a single sentence: a fundamental right to education requires the state to
provide individuals with the skills to comprehend the political discourse of
the day, evaluate its merits, and then act thoughtfully through the ballot and
other means of accountability.372
Breaking that standard into its component parts, historical practices
demonstrate, first, that requisite comprehension entails a high level of read-
ing comprehension, something akin to the ability to read on a modern-day
twelfth-grade level.  While determining the appropriate reading level is far
from an exact science, a twelfth-grade reading comprehension level, or
higher, is a conservative estimate.  The most relevant political texts and dia-
logue of the era would have demanded no less.  Most presidential speeches
were delivered at a college reading level.373  Even the Gettysburg Address—
one of the simplest of the era—measures at an eleventh-grade level.374  The
Declaration of Independence is at college level.375  As the chart below dem-
onstrates, analysis of the typical state constitution—the most important mea-
365 See supra notes 167–94 and accompanying text.
366 See subsection III.B.1.
367 See subsection III.B.2.
368 See Carwardine, supra note 65, at 1–2.
369 See Bunting, supra note 313, at 261.
370 See 2 BRYCE, supra note 66, at 929–38.
371 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. XIII, § 2.
372 Although reaching her conclusions based on political theory and modern necessi-
ties rather than constitutional originalism, Suzanna Sherry interestingly forwards a similar
theory of education.  Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 157 (1995).
373 Thompson, supra note 359.
374 Drutman, supra note 362.
375 Id.
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sure on which citizens would cast votes—reveals that the constitutions
regularly measure at the maximum grade-level score—which is twelfth
grade—and most often hit a college level in terms of reading ease.376
FIGURE 2:  READABILITY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS




























Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Flesch Reading Ease
Second, evaluation of texts, regardless of the complexity of the text,
requires the ability to situate what has been read in a larger context of knowl-
edge and judge it.  This, at the least, entails a working understanding of gov-
ernment structure, function, and policy, as well as individual rights.377
Third, thoughtful action entails everything from active engagement in the
debate itself—through print or otherwise—to the cast of a ballot that fur-
thers one’s own interests as well as the republican form of government
itself.378  This last skill is largely the natural outgrowth of the first two, but
could involve two important additional components.
The first is the ability not just to evaluate written text, but to also engage
in advocacy through the written text.  If the written word was the first forum
of defense for oppressed citizens,379 those citizens must actually have the
376 This analysis is based on a sample of state constitutions.  The sample only includes
those constitutions for which an html or Word document version was available.  Others
were only available in picture format and excluded due to the labor required to input
them manually.
377 A republican form of government was among the purposes of the Kentucky educa-
tion clause and, in defining the scope of the fundamental right to an adequate education,
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the right to education required “sufficient knowl-
edge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed
choices” and “sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to
understand the issues that affect” the nation.  Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).  Several other states have adopted the same exact require-
ments as Kentucky. See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1233–35 (Kan. 2014); Clare-
mont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359–60 (N.H. 1997).
378 See generally Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359 (requiring the ability to make informed
decisions about policy).
379 See, e.g., 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 66, at 697.
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ability to cogently make their case in the written public form.  The second
ability might involve a deeper understanding of government.  If citizens are
to act in the interests of the greater good, they must understand and appreci-
ate that greater good, which is not an automatic outgrowth of education.
While amorphous, this greater good is one that the Supreme Court has
frequently referenced in regard to education.  The Court in Brown v. Board of
Education famously emphasized that education “is the very foundation of
good citizenship” and the means by which government “awaken[s] the child
to cultural values.”380  In other cases, the Court has similarly remarked that
schools, through the “preparation of individuals for participation as citi-
zens, . . . preserv[e] . . . the values on which our society rests.”381
Some, looking for solutions to modern problems, might smirk at the
notion of a constitutional right to an education largely grounded in concepts
of literacy and civics curriculum.  What of computers, coding, calculus, and
foreign language they might ask?  First, the task of this Article was not to find
evidence for a right to education that meets all the needs of modern stu-
dents.  The task was to assess whether any federal right to education might
exist and, if so, whether history provides any markers for its substantive mean-
ing.  That meaning is most clearly evidenced in the demands of citizenship.
With that said, the evidence also reveals a strong commitment to creating
economically self-sufficient citizens.382  Citizens should tend to society’s need
in the public forum and tend to their own through economic freedom and
productivity.383  This history may warrant further exploration, but it involves
an additional logical step that is not as closely tied to this Article’s thesis
regarding self-governance.
Second, this fundamental right would be too permissive if it underesti-
mates both what literacy in a republican form of government entails and the
level of literacy deficiency among modern students.  The literacy of the Four-
teenth Amendment era is best described as critical literacy, meaning that it
entailed both high-level reading and critical thinking.  While a larger per-
centage of today’s population may be able to read children’s stories than it
could 150 years ago, a large percentage of today’s students appear to read at
a lower functional level, have fewer critical thinking skills, and a far narrower
understanding of government than those who could read and engage in the
political process in the post–Civil War period.384  Today’s students certainly
read less often and far less challenging texts, know far less about their basic
380 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
381 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
382 See, e.g., FONER, supra note 201, at 244 (discussing the Civil Rights Act as offering the
first definition of citizenship, which included economic freedom).  The bulk of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866’s prohibitions were aimed at contract and property rights.  The
Supreme Court in 1968 and 1976 would confirm the centrality of the rights of contracting
and property rights to the Civil War–era amendments.  Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
383 See, e.g., FONER, supra note 201, at 244.
384 See REBELL, supra note 70, at 2–3, 17–18; Botstein, supra note 67, at 57–60; Sherry,
supra note 372.
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rights, and vote at far lower rates than their predecessors.385  It is the bottom
end of our education system for which the right to education means so
much.  For them, literacy on par with the expectations and needs of the
post–Civil War era would be a major improvement.386
Finally, to say that the Federal Constitution only guarantees one set of
skills does not mean schools will no longer be expected to provide other
skills.  Many state constitutions do, in fact, require those other skills, as do
state and federal statutes.387  The point of a federal fundamental right to
education is simply to recognize that our Constitution demands a uniform
baseline regarding the skills that our political form of government rests
upon.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental right to education holds a unique allure for the
Supreme Court.  The Court’s initial draft of its opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education declared school segregation unconstitutional because it violated a
fundamental right, not equal protection.388  Yet, with the stroke of a pen, the
Court deleted a couple of words and changed the course of the next half
century of education rights.389  Since Brown, the Court has refused to recog-
nize a right to education while carefully remaining open to the possibility of
a different result if the right facts and theory arose.  The precedential value
of the Court’s prior statements on education, however, is minimal.  The
Court may describe education in terms normally reserved for fundamental
rights, but its descriptions remain little more than rhetorical flourishes.
The Court has not taken the next step because it lacks compelling expla-
nation for why our Constitution protects education as a fundamental right.
Most litigants and scholars have premised their arguments on the impor-
tance of education as general principle.  None have specifically anchored the
right in the original intent of the constitutional Framers.  Given the Court’s
increasingly restrictive approach to fundamental rights, an originalist expla-
nation may be the only one the Court would accept.  Originalism protects the
Court from the potential error of its own judgment, as well as the inevitable
critique that the Court is inventing rights.  More important, an originalist
argument could, in effect, compel the Court to recognize a right to educa-
tion, not simply because it wants to, but because the Framers would have
expected it.
This Article finally fills that originalist gap, demonstrating that public
education was a central premise of the very form of government the Constitu-
385 See, e.g., REBELL, supra note 70, at 17–21; Bennett et al., supra note 28.
386 More than one in four twelfth graders do not even read at a basic level. NAT’L
ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRAMS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION: READING PERFORMANCE 3
(2018).
387 See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Leandro
v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255–56 (N.C. 1997).
388 Hacker & Blake, supra note 7, at 46–50.
389 Id.
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tion enshrined in 1787.  Honoring the national commitment to education,
however, has never been easy.  Were it so, advocates would not be calling for
the right to education more than two centuries after the Constitution’s fram-
ing.  Yet, at the end of the Civil War, Congress saw the problem that failing to
fully and formally declare a right to education had caused.  To cure it, Con-
gress forced Southern states—in conjunction with ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment itself—to amend their state constitutions to guarantee public
education.  After the Fourteenth Amendment, no state would ever again
enter the Union without an education clause in their state constitution.  This
overlooked history provides the exact evidence the Court has required to
recognize a fundamental right.  If the Court ever recognizes a fundamental
right to education, the specific facts detailed in this Article will be the basis.
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